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Abstract
We settle the complexity of computing an equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games
with player-specific affine cost functions le,i(x) = ae,ix+ be,i as we show that the computation
is PPAD-complete. To prove that the problem is contained in PPAD, we develop a homotopy
method that traces an equilibrium for varying flow demands of the players. A key technique for
this method is to describe the evolution of the equilibrium locally by a novel block Laplacian
matrix where each entry of the Laplacian is a Laplacian again. Using the properties of this matrix
allows to recompute efficiently the Laplacian after the support of the equilibrium changes by
matrix pivot operations. These insights give rise to a path following formulation for computing
an equilibrium where states correspond to supports that are feasible for some demands and
neighboring supports are feasible for increased or decreased flow demands. A closer investigation
of the block Laplacian system further allows to orient the states giving rise to unique predecessor
and successor states thus putting the problem into PPAD. For the PPAD-hardness, we reduce
from computing an approximate equilibrium of a bimatrix win-lose game. As a byproduct of
our reduction we further show that computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium with class
dependent affine cost functions is PPAD-complete as well.
On our way, we obtain several new results regarding the multiplicity of equilibria in atomic-
splittable games with player-specific cost functions. When the coefficients ae,i are in general
position, every game has a finite set of equilibria while without this assumption there may be
a continuum of equilibria. When the additive constants be,i are in general position, games have
an odd number of equilibria except for a nullset of demand values.
As another byproduct of our PPAD-completeness proof, we obtain an algorithm that com-
putes a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the players’ flow demand. For player-specific
costs, the continuum may involve several increases and decreases of the demand and yields an
algorithm that runs in polynomial space. For games with player-independent costs, only demand
increases are necessary yielding an algorithm computing all equilibria as a function of the flow
demand that runs in time polynomial in the output.
∗Funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excel-
lence Strategy – The Berlin Mathematics Research Center MATH+ (EXC-2046/1, project ID: 390685689).
1 Introduction
Congestion games are a central topic in algorithmic game theory with applications in traffic [5, 15,
52, 48], telecommunication [4, 44, 46], and logistics [12]. We are given a graph G = (V,E) with
a finite set of k commodities, each specified by a triplet (si, ti, ri) ∈ V × V × R≥0 consisting of a
source node si, a target node ti, and a fixed demand rate ri. Each edge e ∈ E is endowed with a
flow-dependent (and possibly commodity-specific) cost function le,i : R≥0 → R≥0 that maps its flow
x¯e =
∑k
i=1 x
i
e to a cost le,i(x¯e) experienced by all flow particles of commodity i using that edge.
In Wardrop’s basic model [52], each commodity corresponds to a continuum of users. Each
user acts selfishly in minimizing their total cost, i.e., the sum of the costs of the used edges. The
corresponding equilibrium concept of a Wardrop equilibrium is defined as a multi-commodity flow
with the additional property that each commodity only uses paths of minimum cost. Wardrop
equilibria exist under mild assumptions on the cost functions [5, 51]. When the cost functions of an
edge are equal for all commodities, an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by convex
programming techniques [5]. For the case of commodity-dependent affine cost functions, Meunier
and Pradeau [41] very recently showed that the problem to compute a Wardrop equilibrium lies in
PPAD, but left it as an open problem whether the problem is actuall PPAD-complete.
In the light of the rise of navigation systems such as Waze and TomTom and ride sharing
platforms such as Lyft and Uber, and in view of the anticipated market penetration of autonomous
cars, it is sensible to assume that in the near future several competing companies will control
significant portions of the road traffic. Similarly, the ongoing discussion on Net Neutrality Rules
for the Internet are fueled by the fact that few companies constitute and control large portions of the
internet traffic, e.g., these days Netflix and YouTube each constitute about 15% of total downstream
traffic worldwide [50]. In these traffic scenarios some players may be willing to sacrifice the cost
experienced by some of their traffic in order to improve the overall cost of their flow, see also the
discussion in Catoni and Pallottino [9]. Atomic splittable congestion are a much more compelling
model in these situations. In such a game, each commodity corresponds to a single player who
controls a splittable flow of traffic in the network. The goal of the player is to minimize the total
cost of the its flow defined as C(x) =
∑
e∈E x
i
e le,i(x¯e). A multi-commodity flow x = (x
1, . . . ,xk)
is a Nash equilibrium if Ci(x) ≤ Ci(x˜i,xi) for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all si-ti-flows of rate
ri, where (x˜
i,xi) denotes the multi-commodity flow where all player j 6= i send the flow xj and
player i sends the flow x˜i.
Despite considerable progress regarding the computational complexity of general equilibria in bi-
matrix games [10, 16], Wardrop equilibria [5, 41], and atomic-unsplittable congestion games [1, 19],
much less is known regarding the computation of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games.
For affine player-independent cost functions, Cominetti et al. [12] showed that an equilibrium can be
found by computing the minimum of a convex potential function, see also Huang [32] for a combina-
torial algorithm for special graph topologies. Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [8] proposed two algorithms
with exponential worst-case complexity that compute ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria in singleton
games with convex costs. Harks and Timmermans [25] developed a polynomial time algorithm that
computes an equilibrium in singleton games with player-specific affine cost functions.
Besides leaving the complexity of computing an equilibrium wide open, the approaches above
also yield only a single equilibrium for a fixed vector of player demands. Moreover, the algorithms of
Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [6] and Harks and Timmermans [25] work only for singleton games played
on a network with two nodes. In actual traffic scenarios, the assumption that the players’ demand
vector is fully known and fixed is unrealistic since demands often fluctuate. In this paper, we are
interested in understanding how the equilibria in atomic splittable games change as a function of
the players’ demand vectors.
1
Our results and techniques. We settle the complexity of computing an equilibrium in an atomic
splittable congestion game with player-specific affine costs showing that it is PPAD-complete. The
complexity class PPAD (“polynomial parity argument on directed graphs”) captures the complexity
of search problems that can be solved by directed path-following algorithms [45]. A problem is in
PPAD if there is an exponential set of states S and polynomial computable functions start, pred(·),
and succ(·) computing a start state, and well-defined predecessor and successor states for a given
state. The goal is to compute a solution which is defined as a state that does not have a successor
(different from the start state that does not have a predecessor). Most notably the problem to
compute an equilibrium of a bimatrix game is PPAD-complete, even in special cases [10, 16, 40].
Formally, we show the PPAD-completeness of the following problem:
Nash-Atomic-Splittable
Input: atomic splittable congestion game (G,K, l)
with graph G=(V,E), commodities K=
(
(s1, t1, r1), . . . , (sk, tk, rk)
)
,
and cost functions le,i(x) = ae,i x+ be,i for some ae,i ∈ R>0, be,i ∈ R≥0.
Output: Nash equilibrium x of (G,K, l).
Result 1 (cf. Theorems 3 and 5). Nash-Atomic-Splittable is PPAD-complete.
To show PPAD-hardness, we reduce from the problem to compute an n−β-approximate Nash
equilibrium for a n × n win-lose bimatrix game that is PPAD-complete for all β > 0 [11]. Our
reduction requires only two players and produces an atomic splittable congestion game on a planar
graph implying hardness even for this special case. This is an interesting contrast to the PLS-
completeness results for computing Nash equilibria in unsplittable congestion games using a non-
constant number of players and highly non-planar graphs [2, 19]. As a byproduct, we also obtain
PPAD-completeness for a related problem settling an open question from Meunier and Pradeau [41].
Result 2 (cf. Theorem 6). Computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
The more challenging part of the proof is to show that Nash-Atomic-Splittable is contained
in PPAD. To this end, we develop a path following algorithm that pivots over player supports in
a similar fashion to the Lemke-Howson-algorithm for bimatrix games [38]. Our algorithm follows
a continuous path of Nash equilibria x(λ) for demand rates λr1, . . . , λrk while changing λ ∈ [0, 1].
During the course of the algorithm, λ is changed in a continuous but non-monotonic matter. To
describe the evolution of λ consider an arbitrary value λ∗ ∈ [0, 1) and a corresponding equilibrium
x(λ∗) and let us fix the supports of (x1, . . . ,xk). By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for each
player, we derive that in x(λ∗) every player only uses paths that minimize the marginal total cost.
This implies that for every player i, there is a vector of vertex potentials πi such that that player i
uses edge e = (u, v) if and only if the difference in vertex potentials πiv − π
i
u is at least be,i. Going
further, we can reformulate the Nash equilibrium conditions as a system of linear equations of the
form y = Lπ − b where y = ((y1)⊤, . . . , (yk)⊤)⊤ is a block excess vector containing the excess
yiv for each player i and each vertex v, π = ((π
1)⊤, . . . , (πk)⊤)⊤ is the block potential vector, and
b ∈ Rnk is an appropriate offset. The matrix L ∈ Rnk×nk is a block matrix of the form
L :=


L11 −L12 · · · −L1k
−L21 L22 · · · −L2k
...
...
. . .
...
−Lk,1 −Lk2 · · · Lkk

 ,
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where the diagonal matrices Lii are weighted Laplacian matrices for the graph containing only the
edges in the support of player i. The off-diagonal matrices −Lij and −Lji with i 6= j are the
negative of weighted Laplacian matrices for the graph containing only the edges in the support
of both player i and j. The weights of the matrices Lij depend on the coefficients ae,j while the
weights of the matrices Lji depend on the coefficients ae,i so that L is non-symmetric. We call L the
block Laplacian matrix of the graph. We proceed to show that the block Laplacian borrows a lot
of structure from normal graph Laplacians. In particular we show that rank(L) = k(n− 1), except
for a degenerated case that will be discussed later. This implies that (after fixing without loss of
generality the potentials πisi = 0 for all players i) there is a bijection between excess vectors and
potentials. In particular, we obtain that for a given support the set of equilibria {x(λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}
has dimension at most one. Assuming that the dimensions is exactly one, the one-dimensional
linear space {x(λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]} hits the boundaries of the support at exactly two points, uniquely
defining two neighboring support sets. These support sets will form succ and pred of the current
support set. To obtain a unique orientation, we show that it suffices to consider the determinant
of the block Laplacian after erasing the row and columns corresponding to si for each player i.
As a byproduct, we obtain an algorithm to solve the following problem of computing all Nash
equilibria of an atomic splittable congestion game as a function of the players’ demand rates:
Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable
Input: atomic splittable congestion game (G,K, l)
with graph G=(V,E), commodities K=
(
(s1, t1, r1), . . . , (sk, tk, rk)
)
,
and cost functions le,i(x) = ae,i x+ be,i for some ae,i ∈ R>0, be,i ∈ R≥0.
Output: piece-wise affine function f : [0, 1]→ Rmk such that
f(λ) is a Nash equilibrium for demand rates r1λ, . . . , rkλ for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
To solve Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable, we simply run the trivial PPAD-algorithm
that starts in the Nash equilibrium given by start. Then, it consecutively applies succ on the
current state. During the course of the algorithm, it may be necessary to decrease λ, which leads
to operations that are not reflected in the output of the algorithm. In these cases, we recall the
maximal lambda λ¯ such that f has been outputted for [0, λ¯] and only proceed to output Nash
equilibria once λ¯ is reached again. Not counting the space of the output (which may be exponential
in the input), this algorithm can clearly be implemented in polynomial space.
Result 3 (cf. Theorem 8). Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in polynomial
space.
For the special case of player-independent cost functions le,i = le,j for all e ∈ E and i, j ∈ [k],
we can show that in our algorithm no decrease of λ is necessary. We then obtain the following.
Result 4 (cf. Theorem 9). Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in output-
polynomial time for non-b-degenerate atomic splittable congestion games with player-independent
cost functions. In particular, the runtime is in O((kn)2.4 + ν(kn)2), where ν is the number of
breakpoints of the piecewise affine function f returned by the algorithm.
Our analysis further allows to obtain the following corollaries regarding the multiplicity of
equilibria.
Result 5 (cf. Corollaries 1 and 2, Example 1). There are games with infinitely many equilibria,
but this does not occur when then coefficient ae,i are in general position. When the constants be,i
are in general position, the games have an odd number of Nash equilibria, except for a nullset of
demands.
3
Related work. Atomic splittable congestion games can be seen as a coalitional version of Wardrop
equilibria [52] where a finite set of player each controls a non-negligible amount of flow [28, 39].
The existence of pure Nash equilibria follows from standard fixed point arguments [34, 47]. Games
with player-specific cost functions were studied by Orda et al. [44] who showed that Nash equilibria
are unique in networks of parallel edges. Richman and Shimkin [46] characterized the set of two-
terminal network topologies that are necessary and sufficient for uniqueness showing that equilibria
are unique if and only if the networks are nearly parallel. The latter class of networks has been intro-
duced by Milchtaich [43] to characterize the uniqueness of multi-class Wardrop equilibria. Harks
and Timmermans [26] characterized the uniqueness of equilibria in atomic splittable congestion
games in terms of the combinatorial structure of the strategy set showing that equilibria are unique
when the strategy space of each player is a bidirectional flow matroid. Bhaskar et al. [6] showed
that edge flows in an atomic splittable game need not be unique even when the cost functions are
player-independent. For games with cost functions that are monomials of degree at most three, edge
flows are known to be unique [4]. The price of anarchy of atomic splittable congestion games has
been studied by Cominetti et al. [12], Harks [23], and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [49]. Catoni
and Pallottino [9] provided a paradox of a non-atomic game where replacing the non-atomic players
of one commodity by an atomic player with the same demand decreases the overall performance of
that commodity. Hayrapetyan et al. [29] and Bhaskar et al. [7] studied this effect in more detail.
Cominetti et al. [12] showed that for games with player-independent affine cost functions an
equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a quadratic program. For special network
topologies (including series-parallel graphs), Huang [32] gave a combinatorial algorithm. For the
case of parallel links, Harks and Timmermans [25] gave a polynomial algorithm that computes the
equilibrium of an atomic splittable congestion game with player-specific affine costs. Bhaskar and
Lolakapuri [8] provided an exponential algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in games
with player-independent convex costs. They also showed that some decision problem involving
equilibria are NP-complete.
Further related are unsplittable congestion games [48] where each commodity chooses a single
path of the network. For results on the existence of equilibria, see [2, 17, 20, 21, 24, 42, 48].
Computing a pure Nash equilibrium in a congestion game with unweighted players and player-
independent cost functions reduces to find the local minimum of a potential function and is, thus,
contained in the complexity class PLS, the class of all local search problems with polynomially
searchable neighborhoods as defined by [33]. Fabrikant et al. [19] and Ackermann et al [1] showed
that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is in fact PLS-complete.
The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in an atomic splittable congestion game with
player-specific affine costs may also be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP).
Harks and Timmermans [25] show this explicitly for the singleton case, but it is not hard to
convince ourselves that such a formulation is also possible in the general case by using the vertex
potentials. However, it is not clear whether the resulting LCP belongs to any of the classes for
which it is known that Lemke’s algorithm terminates [3, 14, 18]. In addition, Lemke’s algorithm
introduces an artificial variable that is traced along the course of the algorithm. Our algorithm, in
contrast, traces the equilibria along a meaningful increase of demand rates. In previous work [37],
we developed an algorithm that computes all Wardrop equilibria parametrized by the flow demand.
While relying on a similar idea, Wardrop equilibria are much more easy to handle since they can
be computed in polynomial time and are essentially unique. For further homotopy methods for
computing equilibria, see [22, 30, 31, 35].
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2 Preliminaries
An atomic splittable congestion game is a tuple (G,K, l) where G = (V,E) is a directed, weakly
connected graph with n vertices V and m edges E, the family K =
(
(s1, t1, r1), . . . , (sk, tk, rk)
)
contains k triples each of which consisting of a source node si ∈ V , a sink node ti ∈ V , and a demand
rate ri ∈ R≥0 for each of the k players, and l is a family of player-specific, strictly increasing affine
linear cost functions l = (le,i)e∈E,i∈[k] with le,i(x) = ae,ix+ be,i for some ae,i ∈ R>0 and be,i ∈ R≥0.
A feasible strategy for every player i ∈ [k] is to route her demand ri between her terminal
vertices si and ti. Thus, a strategy for player i is a si-ti-flow of rate ri, i.e., a non-negative vector
xi = (xie)e∈E in R
m
≥0 satisfying the flow conservation constraints
∑
e∈δ+(v)
xie −
∑
e∈δ−(v)
xie =


ri if v = si,
−ri if v = ti,
0 otherwise
for every vertex v ∈ V . A strategy profile is a vector x = ((x1)⊤, . . . , (xk)⊤)⊤ ∈ Rkm≥0 containing
the flow vectors of all players. We use the notation (x˜i,x−i) for the strategy profile where player
i uses the flow x˜i and all other players use their flow as in the strategy profile x. The cost le,i
experienced by the flow of the player i on some edge e depends on the total flow x¯ = (x¯e)e∈E
where x¯e =
∑k
i=1 x
i
e. Every player wants to minimize the total cost Ci(x) experienced by the flow
sent by this player, i.e., Ci(x) =
∑
e∈E x
i
ele,i(x¯e). We say that x is a Nash equilibrium if for
every player i ∈ [k] there is no profitable deviation from x, i.e., Ci(x) ≤ Ci(x˜
i,x−i) for all si-
ti-flows x˜
i of rate ri. The marginal total cost of player i on edge e given the flow x is given by
µie(x) :=
∂
∂xie
xiele,i(x¯e) = le,i(x¯e) + x
i
el
′
e,i(x¯e) = ae,ix¯e + be,i + ae,ix
i
e. We obtain the following char-
acterization of Nash equilibria, see, e.g., Bhaskar et al. [6] for a reference.
Lemma 1. The strategy profile x is a Nash equilibrium flow if and only if, for every player i, xi
is a si-ti-flow and
∑
e∈P µ
i
e(x) ≤
∑
e∈Q µ
i
e(x) for all si-ti-paths P,Q with x
i
e > 0 for all e ∈ P .
Lemma 1 states that x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if all path used by player i are also
shortest path for that player with respect to the marginal costs. This enables us to give another
characterization based on (shortest path) potentials.
Lemma 2. The flow x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ [k] there is a potential vector
π
i = (πiv)v∈V with π
i
w−π
i
v = µ
i
e(x) if x
i
e>0, and π
i
w−π
i
v ≤ µ
i
e(x) if x
i
e=0 for all e = (v,w) ∈ E.
We denote the block flow vector with x = ((x1)⊤, . . . , (xk)⊤)⊤ and the block potential vector
with π = ((π1)⊤, . . . , (πk)⊤)⊤. For every edge e ∈ E, let Se ⊆ [k] be some subset of the players.
Then we call the family S := (Se)e∈E of all these sets a support. We say an edge e is active for
player i if i ∈ Se, and e is inactive for player i otherwise. We say a Nash equilibrium x has the
support S if for every edge e = (v,w) ∈ E, i ∈ Se implies that π
i
w−π
i
v = µ
i
e(x). Thus, S is a support
of the Nash equilibrium x if for every active edge the inequality πiw − π
i
v ≤ µ
i
e(x) is satisfied with
equality. In general, there are multiple supports for the same equilibrium, since for every player i,
any edge with xie = 0 and π
i
w − π
i
v = µ
i
e(x) can be considered to be an active or an inactive edge.
Given a support of a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium flow can be obtained by solving the system
of equations πiw − π
i
v = µ
i
e(x), i ∈ Se, e = (v,w) ∈ E for the unknowns π and x. For affine cost
functions this reduces to a system of linear equations that can be solved explicitly. This will be the
key element of our analysis and we discuss this in further detail in the next section.
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3 Weighted Block Laplacians
In this section, we consider some fixed support S that is the support of some Nash equilibrium
x. The goal is to express the multi-commodity excess vector y of the flow x as a linear system of
the form y = Lπ − b, where π is the potential vector from Lemma 2. To this end, for any two
players i, j ∈ [k] and any edge e ∈ E, let ωije := 1 if {i, j} ⊆ Se, and ω
ij
e := 0, otherwise. We also
write ωie as a shorthand for ω
ii
e . Further, let κe := |Se| be the number of players using the edge e
in S. We introduce the diagonal matrices Ωi := diag(ωie1 , . . . , ω
i
em) for every player i ∈ [k] and the
block diagonal matrix Ω that contains all Ωi as block diagonal elements. Further, we introduce
the km × km block matrix K that contains blocks of size m × m, all being the diagonal matrix
K˜ := diag
(
1
κe1+1
, . . . , 1
κem+1
)
. Finally, let C˜
i
:= diag
(
1
ae1,i
, . . . , 1
aem,i
)
∈ Rm×m and C˜ the km×km
block diagonal matrix containing the matrices C˜
i
as diagonal blocks.
We define the matrices1
W := (Ikm −KΩ)C˜
and C := ΩW = Ω(Ikm −KΩ)C˜
where Imk is the mk ×mk identity matrix. Denote by G the kn× km block diagonal matrix that
contains k copies of the incidence matrix Γ. Let 1 ∈ Rn be the all-ones-vector. The matrix Γ has
rank n− 1 by definition2 and Γ⊤1 = 0. Thus, the right left nullspace of the matrix G is
N :=
{
π ∈ Rnk | G⊤π = 0
}
= {π = (α11
⊤, . . . , αk1
⊤)⊤ ∈ Rnk | α1, . . . , αk ∈ R
}
.
It is obvious that, if π is a potential for some Nash equilibrium x, then π + π′ is a potential for
the same flow for all π′ ∈ N since the conditions of Lemma 2 depend only on potential differences.
Therefore, it will be convenient to consider only potentials from the quotient space Rnk/N . To this
end, we define the vector space
P :=
{
π ∈ Rnk | πisi = 0 for all players i ∈ [k]
}
where every potential is normalized such that the potential value of every player is 0 for the source
vertex of the respective player. We refer to this subspace of Rnk as the potential space. The potential
space is isomorphic to Rnk/N and has the advantage that the potentials πiv can be interpreted as
the marginal costs of any si-vi-path used by player i. Another technical problem with ambiguity
can arise if not all vertices of G are connected by active edges for some player. In this case, the
potential of that player can be changed on the connected components without changing the flow.
To avoid this problem, we say a support S is a total support if, for every player i, the subgraph of
G containing only edges e with i ∈ Se is connected. It is not hard to show, that there always exists
a potential and some total support for any Nash equilibrium x and, hence, it is no restriction to
consider total supports only.
Lemma 3. The matrix W is non-singular. If S is total, then ker(CG⊤) = N .
Proof. For the first claim, we observe that the matrix C˜ is non-singular. Hence we only need to
show that the matrix W′ := (Imk −KΩ) is non-singular. Consider a row of W
′. Every such row
corresponds to a player i and an edge e. Now, we have two cases. If κe = 0 (i.e., no player uses
this edge) the row contains only a 1 as diagonal element. If κe ≥ 1 the row contains 1−
1
κe+1
ωie as
1The matrices W and C, as well as the matrices Ω and K, depend on the support S . For ease of exposition, we
omit this dependence whenever the support S is fixed.
2Under the assumption that the graph G is connected.
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diagonal element and the off-diagonal elements 1
κe+1
ωije , j 6= i (all other elements are zero). Hence,
the difference of diagonal elements and off-diagonal elements is
1−
1
κe + 1
ωie −
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
1
κe + 1
ωije = 1−
k∑
j=1
1
κe + 1
ωije = 1−
κe
κe + 1
> 0
in this case. Overall, we conclude that W′ is strictly diagonal dominant and, hence, non-singular.
For the second claim, let W¯ be the matrix obtained fromW by removing all rows and columns
corresponding to a player-edge-pair with i /∈ Se. Further, let G¯ be the matrix obtained from G by
removing columns in the same way. Then the non-zero rows of CG⊤ can be expressed as W¯G¯
⊤
.
With the same argumentation as for the first claim we obtain that W¯ is non-singular. Since S is
a total support, we also know that ker(G¯
⊤
) = N . Thus, the claim follows.
Finally, we can use the preceding technical definitions to obtain linear functions that give a
connection between potential, flow, and excess vectors.
Theorem 1. Let x be a Nash equilibrium flow with potential π and support S. Denote by y := G⊤x
the multi-commodity excess vector. Then,
x = C(G⊤π − b) (1)
and
y = LSπ − bS , (2)
where LS := GCG
⊤ and bS := GCb. Further, we have x¯e = u
⊤
e,iKΩC˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
for all i ∈ [k],
where ue,i is the unit vector corresponding to player i and edge e.
Proof. Given the Nash Equilibrium x and the potential π we obtain from Lemma 2, that for every
edge e = (v,w) ∈ E
πiw − π
i
v = ae,i
(∑
j∈Se
xje + x
i
e
)
+ be,i if i ∈ Se,
xe,i = 0 if i /∈ Se.
This system of linear equations is equivalent to the following system
2xie +
∑
j∈Se
j 6=i
xje = ρ
i
e if i ∈ Se,
xie = ρ
i
e if i /∈ Se
where ρie = ω
i
e
πiw−π
i
v−be,i
ae,i
. Denote by J ∈ Rmk×m the block matrix that contains m copies of the
m×m identity matrix Im. Then the above system can be expressed as(
Imk +ΩJ(ΩJ)
⊤
)
x = ρ.
Using the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula, we obtain that(
Ikm +ΩJ(ΩJ)
⊤
)−1
= Ikm −ΩJ
(
Im + (ΩJ)
⊤ΩJ
)−1
(ΩJ)⊤.
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We observe that (ΩJ)⊤ΩJ =
∑k
j=1Ω
j = diag(κe1 , . . . , κem). Thus, the inverse
(
Im+(ΩJ)
⊤ΩJ
)−1
=
diag
(
(κe1 + 1)
−1, . . . , (κem + 1)
−1
)
= K˜ exists. Finally, we note that the vector ρ can be written
as ρ = ΩC˜(G⊤π − b). Overall, we obtain that
x =
(
Ikm −ΩJ
(
Im + (ΩJ)
⊤ΩJ
)−1
(ΩJ)⊤
)
ρ
=
(
Ikm −ΩJK˜(ΩJ)
⊤
)
ΩC˜ (G⊤π − b)
=
(
Ikm −ΩKΩ
)
ΩC˜ (G⊤π − b)
= Ω
(
Ikm −KΩ
)
C˜ (G⊤π − b) = C (G⊤π − b).
Since the excess vector of player i can be computed as yi = Γxi, we obtain the total excess
vector as y = Gx establishing the second part of the theorem.
For the last part, we observe that the total flow on some edge e can be computed as follows.
x¯e =
∑
j∈Se
xje =
∑
j∈Se
u⊤e,jC˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
=
(∑
j∈Se
u⊤e,j −
∑
j∈Se
u⊤e,jKΩ
)
C˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
(∗)
=
(
(κe + 1)u
⊤
e,iKΩ− κeu
⊤
e,iKΩ
)
C˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
= u⊤e,iKΩC˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
.
For the step marked with (∗) we use that the matrix KΩ the same rows for every fixed edge e and
all players i. Further, we used that (κe + 1)u
⊤
e,iK =
∑k
j=1 ue,i. Both facts follow directly from the
definition of the respective matrices.
Theorem 1 implies the following essential observations: Given a potential π we obtain a unique
Nash flow x with Equation (1) and for every flow x we find a unique potential π in the potential
space P (by Lemma 3). Further, every demand vector r induces naturally an excess vector y.
Thus, we can solve Equation (2) to obtain a potential and then use Equation (1) to compute the
Nash flow for the demand r if we know the right support S.
Definition 1. For every support, we refer to the matrix LS := GCG
⊤ as the block Laplacian
matrix of the support S.
We call LS block Laplacian because of the following observation. For a pair of players i and j,
let us introduce the diagonal m×m matrices
Cij :=


diag
(
κe1+1−ω
i
e1
(κe1+1)ae1,i
ωie1 , . . . ,
κem+1−ω
i
em
(κem+1)aem,i
ωiem
)
if i = j,
diag
(
1
(κe1+1)ae1,j
ωije1 , . . . ,
1
(κem+1)aem,j
ωijem
)
otherwise.
Then the matrix C contains the matrices Cii as diagonal blocks and the matrices −Cij as off-
diagonal block elements. Hence, the matrix LS has the form
LS =


L11 −L12 · · · −L1k
−L21 L22 · · · −L2k
...
...
. . .
...
−Lk,1 −Lk2 · · · Lkk


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where every block Lij = ΓCijΓ⊤ is a weighted Laplacian matrix of G with weights Cij . Further,
LS itself has the shape of a Laplacian matrix, but with Laplacian matrices rather than real values
as entries.
Lemma 3 implies that the linear mapping π 7→ C
(
G⊤π − b
)
is injective (on P). If the same
holds for the mapping π 7→ LSπ− bS then, given a support S, there is a unique Nash equilibrium
for every demand r. This is in general not true in the case of player specific cost functions: There
are examples with supports where the kernel of L is bigger than N implying that there are infinitely
many potentials π ∈ P for Nash flows with the same demand r and, since the potential to flow
mapping is injective on P, also infinitely many Nash flows for the same demand. See Example 1 in
Section A.1 for a concrete example with infinitely many equilibria.
Definition 2. A total support S with dim(ker(LS)) > dim(N ) is called a-degenerate.
It is not hard to see that no support is a-degenerate if the coefficients ae,i are in general position.
To see this, consider the matrix LS where all values ae,i of each player i are increased by ǫi. Since
the block diagonal matrices are Laplacians, there is no vector outside of ker(N ) that lets each of
the ǫi vanish, establishing that dim(ker(LS)) = dim(N ).
For any matrix A, we denote by A+ any generalized inverse of A, that is a matrix A+ satisfying
AA+A = A. In particular, the vector A+b is solution for the system Ax = b whenever the system
is consistent. For every non-a-degenerate support S, the equation y = LSπ − bS has a unique
solution in P, meaning there is a unique matrix L∗ such that the solution of the equation is
L∗(y + bS). This particular generalized inverse can be obtained as follows: Define LˆS to by the
matrix obtained from LS be deleting rows and columns corresponding to the potentials π
i
si
for every
player. Then compute the inverse Lˆ
−1
S and add zero rows and columns for the previously deleted
rows and columns. It is easy to show that LˆS is non-singular and that L
∗
S is indeed a generalized
inverse of LS that maps into P.
4 Membership in PPAD
In this section, we show that Nash-Atomic-Splittable is contained in PPAD. To this end, we
define the set of states S as well as the polynomial functions start, succ and pred. The high-level
idea can be described as follows: We consider the equilibria of the game for all possible demand
rates λr with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then the states of S are all supports that are used for some demand
rate λr. As it will turn out, every support is valid for some interval [λminS , λ
max
S ] and at the end of
every interval, we can find another support that is valid on another interval intersecting with the
previous one only in the boundary point. In this way, we can define the predecessor and successor
functions pred and succ and obtain a solution as soon as 1 ∈ [λminS , λ
max
S ] for some support S.
Let r = (r1, . . . , rk) be the vector of all demand rates. Then, the excess direction is the vector
∆y defined as
∆y :=
(
(∆y1)⊤, . . . , (∆yk)⊤
)⊤
with ∆yiv =


−ri if v = si,
ri if v = ti,
0 otherwise.
We say a potential π has the support S if π and its induced flow x (that is the unique x satisfying
Equation 1) satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2. Thus, in particular, if π has the support S, then
the induced flow x is a Nash equilibrium (for some demand). Further, we call an arbitrary potential
vector π ∈ P a λ-potential if it induces a flow x that is a Nash equilibrium for the demand vector
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λr. For every support S, we define the values τSe,i := −1 if i ∈ Se and τ
S
e,i := 1 if i /∈ Se. For every
player i ∈ [k], let Ti := diag(τSe1,i, . . . , τ
S
em,i
) and let T be the km× km block diagonal matrix with
the blocks Ti on the diagonal. Then we can characterize λ-potentials with support S as follows.
Lemma 4. A vector π ∈ P is a λ-potential with support S if and only if
λ∆y = LSπ − bS and TSWS(G
⊤
π − b) ≤ 0.
Proof. For any arbitrary potential π, let x := x(π) be the flow given by Equation (1) (if π is the
potential of some Nash equilibrium flow x then x = x(π) by Theorem 1). Consider the vector
WS(G
⊤
π − b) ∈ Rkm. This vector has a component for every pair of players and edges. Fix
some player i and some edge e and consider the component of this vector corresponding to this
pair, this is u⊤e,iWS(G
⊤
π−b) where ue,i is the unit vector corresponding to this player edge pair.
We distinguish two cases. First, assume i ∈ Se. Then, since u
⊤
e,iΩS = u
⊤
e,iω
i
e = u
⊤
e,i, we obtain
u⊤e,iWS = u
⊤
e,iΩSW = u
⊤
e,iCS . Thus,
u⊤e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) = u⊤e,iCS(G
⊤
π − b) = u⊤e,ix = x
i
e
whenever i ∈ Se. On the other hand, assume that i /∈ Se. Then,
u⊤e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) =
(
u⊤e,iC˜− u
⊤
e,iKSΩSC˜
) (
G⊤π − b
)
= u⊤e,iC˜
(
G⊤π − b
)
− x¯e
=
πiw − π
i
v − b
i
e
ae,i
− x¯e
=
1
ae,i
(
πiw − π
i
v − µ
i
e(x)
)
.
Finally, let π be a potential for some Nash flow x with support S. Then λ∆y = LSπ − bS is
satisfied by Theorem 1. Further, for every i ∈ Se, we obtain
u⊤e,iTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) = τSe,iu
⊤
e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) = −xie ≤ 0
and, for every i ∈ Se,
u⊤e,iTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) = τSe,iu
⊤
e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) = +
1
ae,i
(
πiw − π
i
v − µ
i
e(x)
)
≤ 0
by Lemma 2. On the other hand, if we have some potential π that satisfies the conditions, then
the flow x := x(π) given by Equation (1) is a flow for demand λr by definition that satisfies all
conditions of Lemma 2. Hence, this x(π) is an equilibrium flow.
By Lemma 4, the polytope
PS :=
{
π ∈ P
∣∣ λ ∈ [0, 1], λ∆y = LSπ − bS ,TSWS(G⊤π − b) ≤ 0}
contains all potentials with support S. We call a total support S feasible if PS 6= ∅. Every feasible
support admits a Nash equilibrium for the demand λr for some 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. A game is called
a-degenerate if there is a feasible support that is a-degenerate. For the remainder of this section,
we will assume that every game is non-a-degenerate. We will discuss how to deal with a-degenerate
games in Section A.1. For non-a-degenerate games, LS is invertible on P implying that for fixed λ
there is at most one equilibrium per support.
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(a) Game with two total supports for x = 0.
v
∗
e1 e2
e3
e4 e5
(b) Serial dependent edges.
Figure 1: (a) A 1-player game network (leftmost graph) that admits two potentials (values at the vertices) and two
supports (active edges in red) for the equilibrium flow x = 0 (middle and rightmost graph). (b) The thick edges with
the same color are serial-dependent. In particular, e1 is closer to the marked vertex v
∗ than e2, as well as e3 is closer
to v∗ than e4 and e5.
Corollary 1. Every non-a-degenerate game has a finite number of Nash equilibria.
Before we can define the state set of our PPAD-graph, we have to care about one further
source of ambiguity. Consider for example the network from Figure 1a. If there is one player
with source s and sink t, there are, even if we restrict ourselves to total supports, two different
potentials that induce the same flow (in this example the flow x = (0, 0, 0)⊤). In particular these
two potentials belong to different supports. This ambiguity makes it harder to define predecessor
and successor functions in a well-defined way. To avoid this problem, we will restrict ourselves
to special potentials—namely potentials that can be interpreted as shortest path potentials of the
players. To ensure that all potentials are shortest path potentials, we restrict ourselves to certain
supports, which we will characterize with the following definition.
We say in any graph G = (V,E) two edges e, e′ ∈ E are serial-dependent if there is a subset of
vertices V ′ ⊆ V such that δ+(V ) = {e} and δ−(V ) = {e′} or δ+(V ) = {e′} and δ−(V ) = {e}, i.e.,
the edge-cut induced by V contains exactly one incoming and one outgoing edge, and these cut
edges are exactly e and e′. For some vertex v and two serial-dependent edges e, e′ we say e is closer
to v than e′ if there is a subset of vertices V ′ ⊆ V with v /∈ V ′ and δ+(V ) = {e′} and δ−(V ) = {e}.
See Figure 1b for an illustration of these definitions.
We say a total support S is a shortest-path-support if the following holds for all players i: If e
and e′ are serial-dependent in the graph G and e is closer to si than e then the edge e is active
for player i, i.e., i ∈ Se. In fact, it is not hard to show that if S is a shortest-path-support and
π ∈ PS , then π contains the length of shortest paths for all players to all vertices
3 with respect
to the edge lengths aiex¯e(π) + b
i
e, where x(π) is the flow induced by potential π via Equation (1)
from Theorem 1. Regarding the example from Figure 1a, observe that the edges (s, v) and (v, t) are
serial-dependent, since δ+({v}) = {(v, t)} and δ−({v}) = {(s, v)}. Thus, only supports where (s, v)
is active are shortest path supports which excludes the second support in the rightmost graph.
We define the set
S := {S : S is a feasible, non-a-degenerate, shortest-path-support} (3)
of feasible, non-a-degenerate supports admitting shortest path potentials π only. We then use the
set S as the states of our PPAD-graph. Given any state, i.e., support S ∈ S, we now have to
find predecessors and successors of these states in polynomial time. To this end, we observe that
every polytope is just a line segment that has some direction ∆πS with some fixed orientiation σS
and some endpoints πminS and π
max
S that we call boundary potentials. Each of the two boundary
potentials will be also feasible in some other PS′ for some other support S
′. We will then use these
3For this to be true, we require that the graph G is strongly connected. If this is not the case, additional edges
can be added with latency functions with high offsets.
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supports as predecessors and successors, while the orientation σS determines which one is which.
We continue by formalizing this idea.
Definition 3. Let S ∈ S. Then the sign σS := sgn(det(LˆS)) ∈ {−1,+1} is called the orientation
of S. Further, we call the vector ∆πS := σSL
∗
S∆y the potential direction of S.
For every pair of edge-player-pair (e, i) ∈ E×[k] we denote by ue,i the unit-vector corresponding
to the pair (e, i) and, for every support S, define the vectors
wS,e,i :=
(
TSWSG
⊤
)⊤
ue,i and w
′
S,e,i :=
(
(Ikm −KSΩS)G
⊤
)⊤
ue,i.
The vector wS,e,i is the normal vector of the hyperplane induced by u
⊤
e,iTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) ≤ 0
which is a boundary of PS . Further, as we already have seen in the proof of Lemma 4, for any
potential π, w⊤S,e,iπ is either the flow of player i on edge e if i ∈ Se, or w
⊤
S,e,iπ is the difference of
the marginal cost of player i on edge e and the potential difference on this edge indicating “how
inactive” the edge e is for player i. The vector w′S,e,i is essentially the same vector without the factor
τSe,i and the weights 1/ae,j from the matrix C˜ and will be used later to establish the connection of
the block Laplacians of different supports. We divide all edge-player-pairs (e, i) into groups
E+S :=
{
(e, i) ∈ E × [k] | σSw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS > 0
}
, E−S :=
{
(e, i) ∈ E × [k] | σSw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS < 0
}
and E0S := E× [k]\(E
+
S ∪E
−
S ) which consist of pairs for which the left-hand side of the corresponding
inequality in PS increases, decreases, or is unchanged when moving along the direction ∆πS . (For
active edges the quantity σSw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS be explicitly interpreted as the change of flow of player i
on edge e when moving along the direction ∆πS , i.e., when increasing or decreasing the demand
of all players.) Finally, we define for all (e, i) /∈ E0S
λ¯S,e,i :=
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iWSb−w
⊤
S,e,iL
∗
SbS
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
and set λmaxS := min{1,min(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯S,e,i} and λ
min
S := max{0,max(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯S,e,i}. We obtain the
following characterization of PS illustrated in Figure 2a.
Lemma 5. For every feasible support S ∈ S,
PS =
{
λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS | λ
min
S ≤ λ ≤ λ
max
S
}
. (4)
Proof. Since S is non-a-degenerate, the equation λ∆y = LSπ − bS has the unique solution π =
L∗S(λ∆y + bS) = λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS in P. Thus,
PS =
{
λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, TSWS(G
⊤(λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS)− b) ≤ 0
}
.
The polytope PS is bounded by the inequalities
0 ≥ u⊤e,iTSWS(G
⊤(λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS)− b) = λσw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS +w
⊤
S,e,iL
∗
SbS − τ
S
e,iu
⊤
e,iWSb.
These inequalities are equivalent to λ ≤ λ¯S,e,i for all (e, i) ∈ E
+
S and λ ≥ λ¯S,e,i for all (e, i) ∈ E
−
S .
Hence, the claim follows.
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(b) The potential polytopes of continuative neighbors.
Figure 2: (a) The polytope PS is a segment of the the line with direction ∆piS with extreme points pi
min
S and
pi
max
S . All potentials on this line segment induce Nash equilibria for demands λr with λ
min
S ≤ λ ≤ λ
max
S . (b) The
polytope PS1 of some support S1 with the polytopes of two continuative neighbors. The boundary potentials pi of
the neighboring supports coincide. The polytopes are separated by hyperplanes with normalvector wS,e,i. In this
example, support S2 has negative orientation σS2 < 0, since ∆piS2 is directed away from the maximum boundary
potential.
The two special potentials πminS := λ
min
S σS∆πS + L
∗
SbS and π
max
S := λ
max
S σS∆πS + L
∗
SbS are
the extreme points of PS by definition. We also refer to these points as boundary potentials of S
and call ∂S := {πminS ,π
max
S } the boundary of S. The vector σS∆πS is directed from π
min
S to π
max
S
while the actual potential direction ∆πS may be oriented in opposite direction if the orientation is
negative. We will use this later when defining predecessor and successor supports. See Figure 2(a)
for an illustration of these results. In order to find successor and predecessor supports, we introduce
the notion of neighboring supports. These are supports S,S ′ where the activity state of exactly one
edge differs in S and S ′ for exactly one player.
Definition 4. Two supports S,S ′ (not necessarily from S) are (e, i)-neighboring (or just neigh-
boring) if
(i) Se˜ = S
′
e˜ for all e˜ 6= e and
(ii) S′e \ Se = {i} or Se \ S
′
e = {i}.
Two feasible shortest-path-supports are continuatively neighboring (or continuative neighbors) if
they are neighboring and ∂S ∩ ∂S ′ 6= ∅. We denote by NS the set of all continuative neighbors S.
Further, we defineNmaxS :=
{
S ′ ∈ NS | π
max
S ∈ ∂S∩∂S
′
}
andNminS :=
{
S ′ ∈ NS | π
min
S ∈ ∂S∩∂S
′
}
.
Since the line segments PS and PS′ of two continuatively neighboring supports intersect in
boundary potentials of the respective supports, a continuative neighbor of S continues the line
segment PS . We proceed by proving a technical relation of the matrices C of two neighboring
supports and then show that we can easily identify all continuative neighbors of a supports.
Lemma 6. Let S and S ′ be (e, i)-neighbors. Then,
(i) CS′ = CS +
(
Ikm −ΩS′KS′
)
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS
(
Ikm −KSΩS
)
C˜.
(ii) u⊤e,jWS′ =
κSe +1
κS
′
e +1
u⊤e,jWS +
τSe,i
κS
′
e +1
(
u⊤e,j − u
⊤
e,i
)
C˜ for any player j ∈ [k],
(iii) u⊤e˜,jWS′ = u
⊤
e˜,jWS for all edges e˜ 6= e and for any player j ∈ [k].
In particular, we have wS′,e,i = −
κSe +1
κS
′
e +1
wS,e,i.
Proof. First, we make the following observations: The only difference between S and S ′ is by
definition the different status of edge e for player i. Thus, ωi
′
e′(S
′) = ωi
′
e′(S) whenever e
′ 6= e or
i′ 6= i and ωie(S
′) = ωie(S) + τ
S
e,i. Thus, also ΩS′ differs only in one value from ΩS and we get
ΩS′ = ΩS + τ
S
e,iue,iu
⊤
e,i = ΩS + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS .
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Further, the number of players using an edge is unchanged for all edges but e. Hence , κS
′
e′ = κ
S
e′
for all e′ 6= e, and κS
′
e = κ
S
e + τ
S
e,i. Define ∆κ := −
τSe,i
(κS′e +1)(κ
S
e +1)
= 1
κS
′
e +1
− 1
κSe+1
. Then
K˜S′ = K˜S +∆κueu
⊤
e = K˜S
where ue denotes the m-dimensional unit vector that corresponds to edge e. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, we write KS = JK˜SJ
⊤ where J is the km × m block matrix that contains k copies
of the m × m identity matrix. Then, in particular, KS′ − KS = J∆κueu
⊤
e J
⊤. If we use that
J⊤ue,i = ue and K˜Sue =
1
κSe+1
ue, then we obtain
KS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS = JK˜S′J
⊤ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSJK˜SJ
⊤
= J
1
κS′e + 1
ueu
⊤
e
τSe,i
κS′e + 1
J⊤ = −J∆κueu
⊤
e J
⊤ = KS −KS′ .
(5)
Overall, all this yields
CS′ −CS =
(
ΩS′
(
Ikm −KS′ΩS′
)
−ΩS
(
Ikm −KSΩS
))
C˜
=
(
(ΩS + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS)(Ikm −KS′(ΩS + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS))−ΩS +ΩSKSΩS
)
C˜
=
(
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS −ΩSKS′ΩS −ΩSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ΩS
− ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS +ΩSKSΩS
)
C˜
=
(
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS −ΩS(KS′ −KS)ΩS − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS(KS′ −KS)ΩS
+ ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKSΩS −ΩSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS
)
C˜
(5)
=
(
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS +ΩSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKSΩS + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKSΩS
+ ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKSΩS −ΩSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS
)
C˜
=
(
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS −ΩSKS′ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS
)
(Ikm −KSΩS)C˜
= (Ikm −ΩS′KS′)ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS(Ikm −KSΩS)C˜
which proves (i).
Now, consider any e˜ 6= e and some j ∈ [k]. Then, κS
′
e˜ = κ
S
e˜ . This implies thatKSue˜,j = KS′ue˜,j.
Using again that ΩS′ = ΩS + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS , this yields
(Ikm −ΩSKS)ue˜,j = ue˜,j − (ΩS′ − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS)KSue˜,j
= ue˜,j − (ΩS′ − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS)KS′ue˜,j
= (Ikm −ΩS′KS′)ue˜,j + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue˜,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= (Ikm −ΩS′KS′)ue˜,j.
Further, for any j ∈ [k], we get
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
(Ikm −ΩSKS)ue,j = ue,j − ue,j +
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
ue,j −ΩSKS
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
ue,j
= ue,j −
τSe,i
κS′e + 1
ue,j − (ΩS′ − ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS)KS′ue,j
= (Ikm −ΩS′K
′
S)−
τSe,i
κS′e + 1
ue,j + ue,iu
⊤
e,iTSKS′ue,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
τS
e,i
κS
′
e +1= (Ikm −ΩS′KS′) +
τSe,i
κS
′
e + 1
(
ue,i − ue,j
)
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and, thus, (Ikm − ΩS′KS′) =
κSe+1
κS
′
e +1
(Ikm − ΩSKS)ue,j +
τSe,i
κS
′
e +1
(
ue,j − ue,i
)
. We note that, by
definition, WS = (Ikm −KSΩS)C˜. Using this and the two equalities shown above (ii) and (iii)
follow.
The in particular part follow directly by the definition of the vector w and τS
′
e,i = −τ
S′
e,i.
Lemma 7. Let S be some feasible support. For any pair (e, i) ∈ E× [k], let S ′ be the (e, i)-neighbor
of S. Then,
(i) λ¯S,e,i = λ
min
S if and only if π
min
S ∈ ∂S
′ and
(ii) λ¯S,e,i = λ
max
S if and only if π
max
S ∈ ∂S
′.
Further, if π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′, then CS(G
⊤
π − b) = CS′(G
⊤
π − b), i.e., the flow induced by π is the
same for both potentials.
Proof. Let (e, i) be a edge-player-pair with λ¯S,e,i = λ
min
S . Then, by definition of λ¯S,e,i the inequality
in PS corresponding to (e, i) is tight in π = π
min
S , i.e.,
u⊤e,iTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) = 0. (6)
Note, that since TS is non-singular, this implies u
⊤
e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) = 0 and, using the definition
of WS , we obtain
u⊤e,iC˜(G
⊤
π − b) = u⊤e,iKSΩSC˜(G
⊤
π − b)
Thm. 1
= x¯e. (7)
In order to show that π ∈ PS′ we have to confirm that the inequalities TS′WS′(G
⊤
π−b) ≤ 0
are satisfied. Using Lemma 6(iii), we directly get that all inequalities corresponding to edges e˜ 6= e
are still satisfied since the left-hand-side is the same for S and S ′. The inequality corresponding to
the pair e, i is also satisfied since
u⊤e,iTS′WS′(G
⊤
π − b) = τS
′
e,iu
⊤
e,iWS′(G
⊤
π − b)
L.6(ii)
= −τSe,i
κSe + 1
κSe + 1
u⊤e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b) = 0.
Finally, we consider the inequalities corresponding to edges e and players j 6= i. For these pairs,
we obtain
u⊤e,jTS′WS′(G
⊤
π − b) = τS
′
e,ju
⊤
e,jWS′(G
⊤
π − b)
L.6(ii)
= τSe,j
(
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
u⊤e,jWS +
τSe,i
κS′e + 1
(u⊤e,j − u
⊤
e,i)C˜S
)(
G⊤π − b
)
= τSe,j
(
u⊤e,jWS −
τSe,i
κS
′
e,i + 1
u⊤e,jWS +
τSe,i
κS
′
e + 1
(u⊤e,j − u
⊤
e,i)C˜S
)(
G⊤π − b
)
= τSe,j
(
u⊤e,jWS +
τSe,i
κS
′
e,i + 1
(u⊤e,jKSΩSC˜− u
⊤
e,iC˜)
)(
G⊤π − b
)
= u⊤e,jTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) +
τSe,i
κS
′
e,i + 1
(
u⊤e,jKSΩSC˜(G
⊤
π − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Thm. 1
= x¯e
− u⊤e,iC˜(G
⊤
π − b)
)
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(7)
= u⊤e,jTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) ≤ 0
which implies that π = πminS satisfies all inequalities of PS′ , i.e., π
min
S ∈ PS′ . Since the inequality
corresponding to the pair (e, i) also tight for S ′, πminS ∈ ∂S
′.
If we assume, that λ¯S,e,i 6= λ
min
S , then the inequality for the pair (e, i) is not tight and we obtain
u⊤e,iTS′WS′(G
⊤
π − b)
L.6(ii)
= −τSe,i
κSe + 1
κSe + 1
u⊤e,iWS(G
⊤
π − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
Thus, in this case πminS /∈ PS′ and in particular π
min
S /∈ ∂S
′. Overall, we established claim (i).
Claim (ii) follows with the same proof.
Finally, if π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′, then
CS′(G
⊤
π − b)
L.6(i)
= CS(G
⊤
π − b) + (Ikm −ΩS′KS′)ue,i u
⊤
e,iTSWSC˜(G
⊤
π − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (6)
= CS(G
⊤
π − b)
and, hence, π induces the same flow with respect to both supports S and S ′.
Lemma 7 shows that whenever in a boundary potential π ∈ ∂S the inequality corresponding
to an edge-player-pair (e, i) is tight (i.e., λ¯S,e,i = λ
min
S or λ¯S,e,i = λ
max
S ) then π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S
′ where
S ′ is the (e, i)-neighbor S ′. Thus, if S ′ is also a shortest-path-support, then S ′ is a continuative
neighbor of S. See Figure 2(b) for an illustration. In particular, we can characterize the continuative
neighbors of S in the respective boundary potentials as
N
min
S =
{
S ′ ∈ NS | S
′ is (e, i)-neighbor of S and λ¯S,e,i = λ
min
S
}
and
N
max
S =
{
S ′ ∈ NS | S
′ is (e, i)-neighbor of S and λ¯S,e,i = λ
max
S
}
.
The continuative neighbors are the candidates for the predecessor and successor of the support.
Although restricting to shortest-path-supports eliminates many cases where there exists more than
one continuative neighbor, there can still be some ambiguity. In order to have uniquely defined
predecessors and successors, we make the following non-degeneracy assumption.
Definition 5. A support S is called b-degenerate support if |NmaxS | > 1 or |N
min
S | > 1.
A game is called b-degenerate game if there is a feasible, non-a-degenerate shortest-path-support
that is b-degenerate. For the remainder of this section, we assume that every game is non-b-
degenerate and will present a method to handle b-degenerate games in Section A.2. Using Lemma 7
we can show that whenever a boundary potential is not a 0- or a 1-potential, there is a neighboring
shortest-path-support that is a continuative neighbor.
Lemma 8. If NminS = ∅, then the potential π
min
S is a 0-potential. If N
max
S = ∅, then π
max
S is a
1-potential. Thus, for every boundary potential that does not a starting or a solution potential, we
find a continuative neighbor.
Proof. Assume that for S ∈ S, we have that NminS = ∅. This can happen because of two reasons.
Either no (e, i)-inequality is tight and 0 determines the maximum in the definition of λminS , or some
(e, i)-inequality is tight. In the first case, πminS is a 0-potential as claimed. In the latter case, we
have one or more tight inequalities corresponding to some edge-player-pairs (e, i). By Lemma 7
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all (e, i)-neighbors S ′ of S satisfy ∂S ∩ ∂S 6= ∅. Since we assume that none of these supports is
a continuative neighbor, all these supports are not shortest path supports. Since S is a shortest
path potential, we know that all these neighbors are must have one more inactive edge than S (by
adding a new active edge to a shortest path support, the new support can only be also shortest-path
by definition). In particular, this inactived edge e must be serial-dependent of some other edge
e′, and e must be closer to si than e
′. By definition, the same si-ti paths use the edges e and e
′,
and hence the flow as well as the flow change on these edges must always be the same. Thus, the
inequality of e′ must be tight as well. This means, if we have to inactivate some edge that is in serial
dependence of another edge, we can always inactivate both. In particular, we can inactivate the
last of all serial-dependent edges and therefore preserve the shortest-path-property of the support.
Thus NminS 6= ∅ in this case. The same arguments also hold for the case N
max
S = ∅.
With the non-b-degeneracy assumption, there always is a unique, continuative neighbor for every
boundary potential that does not induce the zero flow or a solution flow for demand r. Hence, we
can define lower neighbor function as
Nmin(S) :=
{
∅ if π is a 0- or 1-potential,
S ′ ∈ NminS otherwise;
the upper neighbor function Nmax(S) is defined likewise. By non-b-degeneracy, these functions
are well-defined. The functions Nmin and Nmax are natural candidates for the predecessor and
successor functions. The last issue we have to address is that the functions must be defined in a
“compliant” way, i.e, they must defined such that pred(succ(S)) = S. The next theorem relates the
block Laplacians (and their generalized inverses) of two neighboring supports and shows that the
oriented potential directions ∆πS of two neighboring supports are always “compliant”, meaning
that they are always oriented in the same way with respect to the hyperplane seperating the
polytopes PS of the neighboring supports (see Figure 2b).
Theorem 2. Let S,S ′ ∈ S be two (e, i)-neighboring supports and let wS,e,i and w
′
S′,e,i be the
vectors as defined above. Then,
(i) the Laplacian matrices satisfy
LS′ = LS +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i. (8)
(ii) the generalized inverses of the block Laplacians satisfy
L+S′ = L
+
S −
1
1 +w⊤S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i
L+Sw
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,iL
+
S . (9)
(iii) the potential directions satisfy
sgn
(
w⊤S,e,i∆πS
)
= − sgn
(
w⊤S′,e,i∆πS′
)
. (10)
Proof. For (i) we observe that by Lemma 6
LS′ − LS = G(CS′ −CS)G
⊤
= G
(
Ikm −ΩS′KS′
)
ue,iu
⊤
e,iTS
(
Ikm −KSΩS
)
C˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=WS
G⊤ = w′S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i.
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Consider the matrix LˆS , obtained from LS by deleting the rows and columns corresponding to the
source vertex respective source vertex for every player. Let wˆS,e,i and wˆ
′
S′,e,i be the vectors wS,e,i
and w′S′,e,i, respectively, without the rows belonging to the source vertex for every player. Then
LˆS is non-singular, since we assume S is non-a-degenerate, and LˆS = LˆS′ +w
′
S′,e,iwS,e,i we obtain
det(LˆS′) = det
(
LˆS
(
I(n−1)k + Lˆ
−1
S wˆ
′
S′,e,iwˆ
⊤
S,e,i
))
= det
(
LˆS
) (
1 + wˆ⊤S,e,iLˆ
−1
S wˆ
′
S′,e,i
)
. (11)
We note that the term v⊤ L+Sv is independent of the choice of the generalized inverse L
+
S for any
vector v belonging to the row- and column space of L [27, Theorem 9.4.1]. Thus, we obtain
1 +w⊤S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i = 1 +w
⊤
S,e,iLˆ
∗
Sw
′
S′,e,i = 1 + wˆ
⊤
S,e,iLˆ
−1
S wˆ
′
S′,e,i
(11)
=
det(LˆS)
det(LˆS′)
6= 0
where L∗S is the generalized inverse of LS obtained from LˆS by adding the appropriate zero rows
and columns.
As we assume non-a-degeneracy, the determinants det(LˆS) and det(LˆS′) are non-zero. We then
obtain (9) with the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula for generalized inverses (see, e.g., [27,
Theorem 18.2.14]).
Using the identity (9) and wS′,e,i = −
κSe+1
κS
′
e +1
wS,e,i from Lemma 6, we get
w⊤S′,e,i∆πS′
(9)
= −
κSe + 1
κS
′
e + 1
w⊤S,e,i
(
L+S −
1
1 +w⊤S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i
L+Sw
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,iL
+
S
)
σS′∆y
= −
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
1
1 +w⊤S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i
w⊤S,e,iL
+
S σS′∆y = −
κSe + 1
κS′e + 1
det(LˆS)
det(LˆS′)
σS′
σS
w⊤S,e,i∆πS
which, by applying the sign-function to both sides, proves (10).
Finally, we can define the predecessor function pred : S → S ∪ {∅} and a successor function
succ : S→ S ∪ {∅} by
pred(S) =
{
Nmin(S) if σS = 1,
Nmax(S) if σS = −1,
succ(S) =
{
Nmin(S) if σS = −1,
Nmax(S) if σS = 1.
Lemma 9. The predecessor and successor functions are well-defined and computable in polynomial
time. Further, we have
(i) pred(S) 6= ∅ ⇒ succ(pred(S)) = S,
(ii) succ(S) 6= ∅ ⇒ pred(succ(S)) = S.
Proof. First, we note that in the non-b-degenerate case the functions Nmax and Nmin are well-
defined and computable in polynomial time since the neighbor support or the fact that no neighbor
exists can be found by solving min(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯S,e,i and max(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯S,e,i. Further, the orientation σS
can be found by computing the determinant of the matrix LˆS
Let S and S ′ be continuative, (e, i)-neighboring supports. Then, by the definition of pred, succ,
Nmin, Nmax, NminS , N
max
S , λ
min
S , and λ
max
S , it is easy to see that
w⊤S,e,i∆πS < 0 ⇔ S
′ = pred(S) and w⊤S,e,i∆πS > 0 ⇔ S
′ = succ(S). (12)
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Assume that S ′ = pred(S) 6= ∅. Then, w⊤S,e,i∆πS < 0. Further, we know from Theorem 2,
that sgn(w⊤S′,e,i∆πS′) = − sgn(w
⊤
S,e,i∆πS). Thus, we get τ
S′
e,iw
⊤
S′,e,i∆πS′ > 0. But this means,
again by (12), that S = succ(S ′) = succ(pred(S)). With the same reasoning we obtain also
pred(succ(S)) = S if succ(S) 6= ∅.
Finally, we want to define the function start that yields a support S ∈ S with no predecessor
and a successor. Let S0 be the total support of the zero flow x0 := 0 which is a Nash equilibrium for
the demand r = 0. By the non-b-degeneracy assumption, this must be the unique support for the
zero flow x0. If there were two supports for the zero flow, then both of them would be continuative
neighbors for any of their successors, contradicting the non-b-degeneracy. Recall that an edge e is
in the support of some player i if the potentials and the marginal cost satisfy πiw − π
i
v = µ
i
e(x). In
particular, the potential of the zero flow x0 can be easily obtained by computing the shortest path
potentials with respect to the edge offsets bie and hence we can easily determine the support S
0.
Lemma 10. For a non-b-degenerate game, let S0 ∈ S be the unique support for the Nash Equilib-
rium x0 = 0 for the demand 0. Then,
(i) the orientation of S0 is positive, i.e., σS0 > 0,
(ii) S0 has no predecessor, i.e., pred(S0) = ∅.
(iii) either there is a Nash equilibrium x for demand r with the support S0 or succ(S0) 6= ∅.
Proof. Denote by Ei := {e ∈ E : i ∈ S0e} the active edges for the player i. By the non-b-degeneracy
assumption, the set Ei is a spanning tree of the graph G. In fact, if there was a cycle in Ei, removing
any edge in the cycle from active edges of player i would yield a total support S ′ such that the
shortest potential π0 of the Nash equilibrium x0 is also feasible in PS′ . This is a contradiction
since, as argued above, the support in a non-b-degenerate game is unique.
For every pair (e, i) with i /∈ S0e , the matrix CS0 has a zero row and zero column by definition.
If we define C¯S0 to be the matrix CS0 without these zero rows and zero columns and define G¯ to
be the matrix obtained from G by deleting the corresponding columns from G, we have that
LS0 = GCS0G
⊤ = G¯C¯S0G¯
⊤
.
From the proof of Lemma 3 we know that CS0 is strictly diagonal dominant except for the zero
rows. Thus, C¯S0 is strictly diagonal dominant and has therefore a positive determinant. Let
Gˆ be the matrix obtained from G¯ by deleting all rows corresponding to source vertices of the
respective players. Then it is easy to show that Gˆ is a quadratic matrix with det(Gˆ) = ±1 and
that LˆS0 = GˆC¯S0Gˆ
⊤
. Hence,
σS0 = det(LˆS0) = det(Gˆ) det(C¯S0) det(Gˆ
⊤
) = det(C¯S0) > 0.
By definition, the potential π0 must be the boundary potential πminS0 , thus, by definition of pred,
and NS , and (i), we obtain pred(S
0) = ∅. By non-b-degeneracy and σS0 > 0, we know that π
max
S0
is distinct from π0. With Lemma 8, the last claim follows.
We have defined polynomial time computable functions start, pred, and succ and the state set
S. Since there is a unique support S0 for the zero flow, every other sink in the PPAD-graph must
contain a 1-potential and is thus a solution of the problem. Hence, we have established the following
theorem.
19
Theorem 3. Nash-Atomic-Splittable is in PPAD.
We obtain the following corollary which mirrors a similar result for non-degenerated bimatrix
games. For the proof, we use that support changes appear only for a nullset of demands since there
are only finitly many supports. This implies that except for a nullset of demands, the equilibria
appear in the relative interior of the polytopes PS for some supports S. This further implies that
these equilibria are all unique startpoints or endpoints of a PPAD-paths. Subtracting the artificial
equilibrium at λ = 0, we have shown that there is an odd number of equilibria.
Corollary 2. A non-b-degenerate atomic splittable congestion game has an odd number of Nash
equilibria except for a nullset of demands.
5 PPAD-hardness
In this section, we show that it is PPAD-hard to compute an equilibrium in an integer-splittable
congestion game with affine player-specific costs.
To prove that computing an equilibrium is PPAD-hard, we reduce from the problem of comput-
ing an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in Win-Lose-Games.
Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game
Input: matrices U,V ∈ {0, 1}n×n, ǫ > 0
Output: strategies y¯, z¯ ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑n
j=1 y¯j =
∑n
j=1 z¯j = 1 such that
y⊤Uz¯ ≤ y¯⊤Uz¯+ ǫ
y¯⊤Vz ≤ y¯⊤Vz¯+ ǫ
for all strategies y, z.
The following result is due to Chen et al. [11].
Theorem 4 (Chen et al. [11]). For any constant β > 0, Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game
for matrices U,V ∈ {0, 1}n×n and ǫ = n−β is PPAD-complete.
We show the following result.
Theorem 5. Nash-Atomic-Splittable is PPAD-hard.
Proof. We reduce from Approximate-Nash-Win-Lose-Game. Let (U,V) be a win-lose game
for some matrices U,V ∈ {0, 1}n×n. We proceed to describe the construction of a corresponding
atomic splittable congestion games (GU,V, {1, 2}, l) with two players with demands d1 = d2 = 1.
The macro structure of the underlying graph GU,V is shown in Figure 3a. We note that our
construction uses constant cost functions (in particular cost functions with constant cost 0) for the
benefit of a simpler exposition. It is not hard to see that the same construction is valid for cost
functions with non-constant functions with very small slopes ae,i = ǫ for a very small ǫ > 0.
There are n2 gadgets Gr,c with r, c ∈ [n] that are arranged in a grid like fashion. The horizontal
edges of the grid as well as the edges connecting s1 and t1 to the grid, shown dashed and blue in
Figure 3a, have constant cost 0 for player 1 and constant cost 2n for player 2. We call these edges
type-1 auxiliary edges. Similarly, the vertical edges of the grid as well as the edges connecting s2
and t2 to the grid, shown dot-dashed and red in Figure 3a have constant cost 2n for player 1 and
constant cost 0 for player 2. These edges are called type-2 auxiliary edges. Every gadget Gr,c with
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s1
t2
t1
s2
G1,1 G1,2 G1,n
G2,1 G2,2 G2,n
. . .
. . .
. . .Gn,1 Gn,2 Gn,n
...
...
...
(a) Macro structure of the reduction.
s¯r
t¯c
t¯r
s¯c
e1r,c,1
e1r,c,2
e1r,c,3
...
e1
r,c,T
e2r,c,1
e2r,c,2
e2r,c,3
...
e2
r,c,T
(b) Gadget Gr,c used in the macro construction.
Figure 3: Construction for the PPAD-hardness of computing a Nash equilibrium in an atomic splittable congestion
game.
r, c ∈ {1, . . . , n} has four designated verices s¯r, t¯r, s¯c, t¯c. In the macro structure, incoming auxiliary
type-1 edges to Gr,c from the left are connected to s¯r, incoming auxiliary type-2 edges from above
are connected to s¯c, outgoing auxiliary type-1 edges to the right are connected to t¯r, and outgoing
auxiliary type-2 edges to below are connected to t¯c.
Every gadgetGr,c has T type-1 main edges e
1
r,c,1, . . . , e
1
r,c,T and T type-2 main edges e
2
r,c,1, . . . , e
2
r,c,T
as well as some auxiliary edges, see Figure 3b. The dashed blue edges are type-1 auxiliary edges
that have constant cost 0 for player 1 and constant cost 4n for player 2 while the dash-dotted red
edges are type-2 auxiliary edges that have constant cost 4n for player 1 and constant cost 0 for
player 2. The structure of Gr,c is such that every path from s¯r to t¯r that does not use type-2
auxiliary edges uses exactly one of the type-1 main edges e1r,c,1, . . . , e
1
r,c,T and all type-2 main edges
{er,c,1, . . . , e
2
r,c,T }. Similarly, every path from s¯c to t¯c that does not use any of the type-1 auxiliary
edges uses exactly one of the type-2 main edges e2r,c,1, . . . , e
2
r,c,T as well as all of the type-1 main
edges {e1r,c,1, . . . , e
1
r,c,T }.
For the type-1 and type-2 main edges, we define the player-specific affine costs as follows. The
player-specific costs are of the form ce,i(x) = ae,ix+ be,i with
ae,1 =
{
1− ur,c if e = e
1
r,c,t with r, c ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ] ,
0 otherwise ;
ae,2 =
{
1− vr,c if e = e
2
r,c,t with r, c ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ] ,
0 otherwise ;
be,i = 0 for all e
1
r,c,t, e
2
r,c,t with r, c ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ] .
We claim that in equilibrium, player 1 does not use any of the auxiliary type-2 edges and
player 1 does not use any of the auxiliary type-1 edges.
Claim 1. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l). Then, x
1
e = 0 for every type-2 auxiliary
edge e and x2e = 0 for every type-1 auxiliary edge.
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Proof of Claim 1. We show the claim only for player 1 since the argumentation for player 2 is
symmetrical. By Lemma 1, player 1 only uses paths with minimal marginal costs in x. The
marginal cost of any path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge e is at least
ae,ix¯e + be,i + ae,ix
i
e ≥ 4n.
On the other hand, every path that does not contain a type-2 auxiliary edge traverses all gadgets
Gr,1, . . . , Gr,n for some r ∈ [n]. In each gadget, Gr,c with c ∈ [n], player 1 traverses one of the
type-1 main edges er,c,tc with tc ∈ [T ] as well as some type-1 auxiliary edges and some type-2 main
edges each of which have no cost for player-1. Thus, the marginal cost of the path is determined
by the n type-1 main edges. Let Er = {e
1
r,c,tc
| c ∈ [n]} be the set of these edges. The marginal
cost of the path is then given by∑
e∈Er
ae,ix¯e + be,i + ae,ix
i
e ≤
∑
e∈Er
x¯e + xe,i ≤ 3n.
We conclude that every path of player 1 not containing a type-2 auxiliary edge has lower marginal
cost than a path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge and the claim follows.
Notice that player 1 has an exponential number of paths from s1 to t1 that do not use any of
the type-2 edges. Every such path visits one row of gadgets Gr,1, . . . , Gr,n for some r ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Within each gadget Gr,c, c ∈ {1, . . . , n} the path uses one of the T type-1 main edges e
1
r,c,1, . . . , e
1
r,c,T .
We claim that in equilibrium, all paths that visit the same row of gadgets have the same flow of
player 1.
Claim 2. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l). Then, x
i
eir,c,t
= xi
ei
r,c,t′
for all i ∈ {1, 2},
r, c ∈ [n] and t, t′ ∈ [T ].
Proof of Claim 2. We show the claim only for player 1 since the argumentation for player 2 is
symmetrical. Let r, c ∈ [n] and t, t′ ∈ [T ] be arbitrary and consider the edges e = e1r,c,t and
e′ = e1r,c,t′ . Since x is a Nash equilibrium, by Claim 1, we may assume that player 1 does not use
any type-2 auxiliary edges and player 2 does not use any type-1 auxiliary edges. Since every path
of player 2 that does not use any type-1 auxiliary edges and traverses the gadget Gr,c uses all type-1
main edges, this implies in particular that x2e = x
2
e′ .
If x1e = x
1
e′ = 0, there is nothing left to show, so it i s without loss of generality to assume that
x1e > 0. This implies that there is a path P from s1 to t1 carrying positive flow. Let P
′ the path
that uses the same edges as P except that in gadget Gr,c edge e
′ is used instead of edge e. (This
means that also some auxiliary type-1 edges are swapped in Gr,c but since they have no cost for
player 1, we may ignore them for the following arguments.) Lemma 1 implies
ae,1x¯e + be,1 + ae,1x
1
e ≤ ae′,1x¯e′ + be′,1 + ae′,1x
1
e′ (13)
which is equivalent to
(1− ur,c)(2x
1
e + x
2
e) ≤ (1− ur,c)(2x
1
e′ + x
2
e′)
using the definition of the cost functions. Further using that x2e = x
2
e′ and that 1 − ur,c ≥ 0 this
implies x1e ≤ x
1
e′ and, thus, x
1
e′ > 0. We conclude that (13) is actually satisfied with equality
implying that x1e = x
1
e′ .
For player 1 and r ∈ {1, . . . , n} let x1r denote the total flow sent along the paths using the rth
gadget row Gr,1, . . . , Gr,n. Similarly, for player 2 and c ∈ {1, . . . , n} let x
2
c denote the total flow
sent along the paths using the cth gadget column G1,c, . . . , Gn,c.
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Claim 3. Let x be a Nash equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l) with T = 2n
β+1 for some β > 0. Then, the
strategy profile (y¯, z¯) with y¯r = x
1
r for all r ∈ [n] and z¯c = x
2
c for all c ∈ [n] is an n
−β-approximate
Nash equilibrium of (U,V).
Proof of Claim 3. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that (y¯, z¯) is not an n−β-approximate
Nash equilibrium of (U,V). Due to symmetry, it is without loss of generality to assume that
player 1 has an alternative strategy y with y⊤Uz¯ > y¯⊤Uz¯+ n−β. This implies in particular that
max
r∈[n]
∑
c∈[n]
ur,cz¯c > min
r∈[n]:y¯r>0
n∑
c=1
ur,cz¯c + n
−β. (14)
Let r∗ ∈ argmaxr∈[n]
∑
c∈[n] ur,cz¯c and let r
′ ∈ argminr∈[n]:y¯r>0
∑n
c=1 ur,cz¯c be arbitrary. Since x is
a Nash equilibrium for GU,V, all used path have the same marginal total cost, and unused path
have higher marginal total cost. Using Claim 2, this implies in particular that
∂
∂x1r′
(∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur′,c)
(
x1r′
T
+ x2c
)
x1r′
T
)
≤
∂
∂x1r∗
(∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur∗,c)
(
x1r∗
T
+ x2c
)
x1r∗
T
)
which gives
∑
c∈[n]
2(1 − ur′,c)x
1
r′
T
+ (1− ur′,c)x
2
c ≤
∑
c∈[n]
2(1 − ur∗,c)x
1
r∗
T
+ (1− ur∗,c)x
2
c .
Using the definition of (y¯, z¯) we obtain
∑
c∈[n]
2(1 − ur′,c)y¯r′
T
+ (1− ur′,c)z¯c ≤
∑
c∈[n]
2(1 − ur∗,c)y¯r∗
T
+ (1− ur∗,c)z¯c.
Finally, we obtain∑
c∈[n]
ur∗,cz¯c ≤
∑
c∈[n]
ur′,cz¯c +
∑
c∈[n]
2(1 − ur∗,c)y¯r∗ − 2(1− ur′,c)y¯r′
T
≤
∑
c∈[n]
ur′,cz¯c +
∑
c∈[n]
2y¯r∗
T
≤
∑
c∈[n]
ur′,cz¯c +
2n
T
=
n∑
c=1
ur′,cz¯c + n
−β,
contradicting (14).
Using that it is PPAD-complete to compute an n−β-approximate equilibrium of a two-player
win-lose game for any β > 0, we conclude that the computation of equilibrium of a atomic-splittable
congestion game is PPAD-hard as well.
With the same arguments, we can also show that the computation of a multi-class Wardrop
equilibrium is PPAD-complete. A multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is a multi-commodity flow that
satisfies the characterization via shortest path potentials of Lemma 2 for the original cost functions
le,i instead for the marginal cost functions µ
i
e, i.e, x is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if for all
i ∈ [k] there is a potential vector πi with πiw − π
i
v = le,i(x¯e) if x
i
e > 0, and π
i
w − π
i
v ≤ le,i(x¯e) if
xie = 0 for all e = (v,w) ∈ E. We prove the following result settling an open question in [41].
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Theorem 6. Computing a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium for commodity-specific affine costs is
PPAD-hard.
Proof. We use a similar construction as in the proof of Theorem 5 with the only exception that
player 1 is replaced by a population of players of size 1 and player 2 is replaced by a population of
players of size 1.
Claim 4. Let x be a Wardrop equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l). Then x
1
e = 0 for every type-2
auxiliary edge e and x2e = 0 for every type-1 auxiliary edge e.
Proof of Claim 4. We again show the claim only for population 1 since the argumentation for
population 2 is symmetric. In a Wardrop equilibrium only paths with minimum cost are used.
The total cost of any path containing a type-2 auxiliary edge e is at least 4n. On the other hand,
every path that does not contain a type-2 edge contains n type-1 main edges contained in some set
Er = {er,c,tc | c ∈ [n]} with tc ∈ [T ] for all c ∈ [n]. The total cost of these edges is equal to∑
e∈Er
ae,ix¯e + be,i ≤
∑
e∈Er
x1e + x
2
e ≤ 2n,
so that we conclude that no path containing a type-2 edge is used in a Wardrop equilibrium.
We proceed to show that population i chooses all type-i main edges within a gadget Gr,c with
the same flow.
Claim 5. Let x be a Wardrop equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l). Then, x
i
eir,c,t
= xi
ei
r,c,t′
for all i ∈ {1, 2},
r, c ∈ [n] and t, t′ ∈ [T ].
Proof of Claim 5. We again show the result only for population 1 since the argumentation for
population 2 is symmetric. Let r, c ∈ [n] and t, t′ ∈ [T ] be arbitrary and consider the type-1 main
edges e = e1r,c,t and e = e
1
r,c,t′ in gadget Gr,c. Using Claim 4, no population i uses auxiliary edges
that are not of type i. This implies in particular that the flow of population 2 on edges e and e′ is
equal, i.e., x2e = x
2
e′ .
If x1e = x
1
e′ = 0 there is nothing left to show, so it is without loss of generality to assume that
x1e > 0. This implies that there is a path P from s1 to t1 carrying positive flow. Let P
′ be the path
that uses the same edges as P except that in gadget Gr,c the type-1 main edge e
′ is used instead
of edge e. The equilibrium condition of Wardrop flows implies that
ae,1x¯e + be,1 ≤ ae′,1x¯e′ + be′,1. (15)
Using the definition of the cost functions, this is equivalent to
(1− ur,c)(x
1
e + x
2
e) ≤ (1− ur,c)(x
1
e′ + x
2
e′).
Further using that x2e = x
2
e′ this implies that x
1
e ≤ x
1
e′ and, thus, x
1
e′ > 0. We conclude that (15)
was satisfied with equality implying that x1e = x
1
e′ .
For population 1 and r ∈ [n], let x1r denote the total flow sent along the paths using the rth
gadget row Gr,1, . . . , Gr,n. Similarly, define x
2
c as the total flow sent by population 2 along the
paths in the cth gadget column G1,c, . . . , Gn,c.
Claim 6. Let x be a Wardrop equilibrium of (GU,V, {1, 2}, l) with T = n
β+1 for some β > 0.
Then, the strategy profile (y¯, z¯) with y¯r = x
1
r for all r ∈ [n] and z¯c = x
2
c for all c ∈ [n] is an
n−β-approximate Nash equilibrium of (U,V).
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Proof of Claim 6. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that (y¯, z¯) is not an n−β-approximate
Nash equilibrium of (U,V). Due to symmetry, it is without loss of generality to assume that
player 1 has an alternative strategy y with y⊤Uz¯ > y¯⊤Uz¯+ n−β. This implies in particular that
max
r∈[n]
∑
c∈[n]
ur,cz¯c > min
r∈[n]:y¯r>0
∑
c∈[n]
ur,cz¯c + n
−β. (16)
Let r∗ ∈ argmaxr∈[n]
∑
c∈[n] ur,cz¯c and let r
′ ∈ argminr∈[n]:y¯r>0 ur,cz¯c be arbitrary. Since x is a
Wardrop equilibrium for GU,V, all used paths have the same cost, and unused paths have higher
costs. Using Claim 5, this implies
∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur′,c)
(
x1r′
T
+ x2c
)
≤
∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur∗,c)
(
x1r∗
T
+ x2c
)
.
Using the definition of (y¯, z¯), we obtain
∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur′,c)
(
y¯r′
T
+ z¯c
)
≤
∑
c∈[n]
T (1− ur∗,c)
(
y¯r∗
T
+ z¯c
)
which yields ∑
c∈[n]
Tur∗,cz¯c ≤
∑
c∈[n]
Tur′,cz¯c +
∑
c∈[n]
(1− ur∗,c)y¯r∗ − (1− ur′,c)y¯r′
and equivalently
∑
c∈[n]
ur∗,cz¯c ≤
∑
c∈[n]
ur′,cz¯c +
∑
c∈[n]
(1− ur∗,c)y¯r∗ − (1− ur′,c)y¯r′
T
≤
∑
c∈[n]
ur′,cz¯c +
∑
c∈[n]
y¯r∗
T
≤
∑
c∈[n]
+n−β
contradicting (15).
Since the computation of an ǫ-approximate equilibrium for win-lose games is PPAD-complete,
we conclude that also the computation of a multi-class Wardrop equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
6 Player-independent cost functions
In this section, we briefly discuss the special case of player-independent cost functions, i.e, games
where the cost functions on the edges are
le,i(xe) := le(xe) = aexe + be
and, thus, independent of the player. In this case, we obtain the following result for the block
Laplacians of any total support.
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Lemma 11. If the coefficients of the cost functions le,i are independent of the player i, then, for
any total support S,
(i) LS is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
(ii) ker(LS) = N .
Proof. If we consider symmetric cost functions, then the block-diagonal matrix C˜ contains k-times
the same block C˜
1
= diag
(
1
ae1
, . . . , 1
aem
)
. By definition, the matrix KS is a k × k-block matrix
containing all the same blocks K˜S . Hence, we obtain KSC˜ = C˜KS . The matrix KS is, as well as
the diagonal matrices ΩS and C˜, symmetric. Further, the diagonal matrices C˜ and ΩS commute.
This yields
C⊤S =
(
ΩS(Ikm −KΩS)C˜
)⊤
= C˜(Ikm −ΩSK)ΩS
= (Ikm −ΩSK)ΩSC˜
= ΩS(Ikm −KΩS)C˜ = CS .
Thus, C⊤S and also LS = GCSG
⊤ are symmetric matrices. Further, the matrix WS has diagonal
elements 1
ae
(
1− 1
κe+1
ωie
)
and off-diagonal elements 0 or − 1
ae(κe+1)
ωije . This means, WS is strictly
diagonal-dominant. (In the non-symmetric case, this only holds for the matrix (Ikm − KΩS) as
shown in the proof of Lemma 3.) This implies that the matrix CS is weakly diagonal dominant
and symmetric, and thus positive semi-definite. This implies that LS = GCSG
⊤ is positive semi-
definite, as well.
Finally, since CS is symmetric and positive semi-definite, we have that GCSG
⊤v = 0 if and
only if CSG
⊤v = 0. Thus, with Lemma 3, the second claim follows.
Sylvester’s criterions states that a matrix is positive semi-definite if and only if all principal
minors of that matrix are positive semi-definite. Thus, by Lemma 11, the principal minor σS =
det(LˆS) is non-negative. Additionally, Lemma 11(ii) implies that all supports are non-a-degenerate.
Thus σS > 0, and we obtain
Theorem 7. If the coefficients of the cost functions le,i are independent of the player i, then
(i) σS > 0 for every total support S. In particular, the game is non-a-degenerate.
(ii) For every demand vector r, there is a unique Nash equilibrium x.
Proof. We have already argued above that σS > 0. Assume that for some demand r there are
two different Nash equilibrium flows x and x′. Then there must be also two different potentials
π,π′ ∈ P for these equilibria. These potentials must lie in different polytopes PS , i.e., the equilibria
x,x′ must have different supports S and S ′. Otherwise, if π,π ∈ PS , then, since PS is convex,
there would be infinitely many equilibria (namely the convex combinations of x,x′) with support
S, implying that S is a-degenerate which is a contradiction to Theorem 7.
Thus, there must be two supports S and S ′ that admit equilibria for demand r. But since all
supports have positive orientation σS > 0, and the predecessor and successor functions are always
well defined, we can follow two independent paths back to λ = 0. Hence, we also have two different
supports for the zero flow. For a non-b-degenerate game, this is a contradiction. But even if the
game is b-degenerate, the assumption would imply that for very small perturbation ε as described
in Section A.2, the perturbed game still has two equilibria with different supports for the same
demand. But, as argued in Section A.2, we know that this game must be non-b-degenerate and,
thus, we again obtain a contradiction and the claim follows.
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7 Parametric computation
Using the trivial PPAD-algorithm, beginning with the support given by start, we can iterate through
(possibly exponentially many) supports using the function pred, until we eventually obtain the
support S for the Nash equilibrium for the demand r.
As a byproduct of this procedure, we obtain a sequence of supports S0, . . . ,Sν , where Sl is the
support of Nash equilibria for demands λr with λ ∈ [λminSl , λ
max
Sl
]. By construction of the successor
function, we know that
⋃ν
l=0[λ
min
Sl
, λmaxSl ] = [0, 1]. Thus, we can define a function λ 7→ S(λ) that
maps every λ to a support of some Nash equilibrium for demand λr. Given the support S(λ) and
λ, we can easily compute a Nash equilibrium for the demand λ with the formulas in Theorem 1.
Hence, we obtain a function f : [0, 1] → Rmk such that f(λ) is a Nash equilibrium for the demand
λr, i.e., a function solving Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable.
Theorem 8. Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in polynomial space.
Proof. Since the function λ 7→ π(λ) that maps a value λ to the potential of a Nash equilibrium for
demand λr is linear for every support (see Lemma 5), and flows depend linearly on the potentials,
the function f is piecewise-linear. Thus, it is enough to compute the potentials at the breakpoints
λminS , λ
max
S explicitly. For any support, this can be clearly done in polynomial time. Since the
functions start and succ can be computed in polynomial time as well, Parametric-Nash-Atomic-
Splittable can be computed in polynomial space.
A game has unique equilbria for all demands if and only if, for every feasible support S, we have
σS > 0. In this case, the function f computes all Nash Equilibria of the game. If, in addition, the
game is non-b-degenerate, then every support corresponds to a breakpoint of the piecewise affine
function f , yielding an output polynomial algorithm. Using Theorem 7 this implies in particular an
output-polynomial algorithm for the parametric Nash equilibrium problem for player-independent
costs.
Theorem 9. Parametric-Nash-Atomic-Splittable can be solved in output-polynomial time
for non-b-degenerate games with σS > 0 for all feasible supports S. In particular, the runtime is in
O((kn)2.4+ν(kn)2), where ν is the number of breakpoints of the piecewise affine function f returned
by the algorithm.
Proof. To obtain the first support S0, we need to solve k shortest-path-problems and then check
km many inequalities for equality. Then we need to setup the Laplacian matrix LS and compute
its (generalized) inverse. Using a fast matrix multiplication algorithm, the latter can be done in
O((kn)2.4) time, e.g., with the Coppersmith-Winograd algorithm [13].
Given the (generalized) inverse of the Laplacian L∗S , potentials and flows can be computed in
O((nk)2) time as it only requires the multiplication of nk× nk matrices with vectors of dimension
nk. We note that by definition the matrix WS has at most k non-zero entries in every row. The
vectors wS,e,i and w
′
S,e,i have also only O(k) many non-zero elements. This implies that all values
λ¯S,e,i as well as their minimum and maximum can be computed in O(km ·k) = O((kn)
2) time. The
bottleneck is thus the computation of the (generalized) inverse of the Laplacian matrix. However,
the inverse does not need to be computed from scratch, but can be obtained with the update
formula from Theorem 2. Since this formula also depends only on the sparse vector wS,e,i and
w′S,e,i with O(k)-many non-zero entries, this update step can also be computed in O((nk)
2)-time.
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Appendix
A Degeneracy
A.1 a-Degeneracy
We are now going to show how the functions start, pred, and succ can be modified, if a-degenerate
supports exist. First, recall that a support S is a-degenerate, if dim(ker(LS)) > dim(N ) = k,
i.e., if LˆS is singular. This means that equation LSπ = y has no longer a unique solution in P.
In fact, if there is an a-degenerate support S that is feasible, i.e., LSπ = y has a solution, then
there must be infinitely many solutions to this equation. Lemma 3 implies that the mapping from
potentials to flows is injective. Thus, if there exists an a-degenerate support, then there must be
also infinitely many Nash equilibrium flows for the same excess vector y and, hence, infinitely many
Nash equilibria for the same demand. See Example 1 for a concrete example where such support
exists.
In general, for an a-degenerate support, all potentials induce the same excess vector y. Thus,
λminS = λ
max
S (we prove this formally in Lemma 13) and the potentials π
min
S and π
max
S are not unique.
This means with our previous definition of the functions, pred and succ are not well-defined in the
case of an a-degenerate support. We now proceed by adapting these functions for the case of
a-degenerate games.
As before, we still (only) use
S := {S : S is a feasible, non-a-degenerate, shortest-path-support}
as the set of states, i.e., even in an a-degenerate game, we only consider non-a-degenerate supports
as states. We observe, that start as defined before yields the support S0 which is non-a-degenerate
by Lemma 10. Hence, we only need to define new successor and predecessor functions.
The first observation that we are going to make is that any (continuative) neighboring support
S ′ of some non-a-degenerate support S is not “too degenerate”. Formally, we say a support S is
weakly-a-degenerate if rank(LS) = k(n− 1)− 1 (or equivalently, if dim(ker(L)) = k + 1). Then we
directly obtain
Lemma 12. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support. Then every neighboring support S ′ of S non-a-
degenerate or weakly-a-degenerate.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we know that the difference between the block Laplacians of two neighboring
supports is a rank-1-matrix. Thus, rank(LS′) ≥ rank(LS)− 1 = k(n− 1)− 1.
For every weakly-a-degenerate support S we know by definition that dim(ker(LˆS)) = 1, i.e.,
there is a direction vector ∆πNS such that ker(LˆS) = span(∆π
N
S ). (This direction is of course not
unique, but it is unique up to a scalar multiplication.) We refer to this direction as the nullspace
direction of the weakly-a-degenerate support S. As it will turn out, if, for example, the successor
S ′ := succ(S) of some non-a-degenerate support S is a-degenerate, then we can use this direction to
find another, non-a-degenerate support S ′′ by following the nullspace direction ∆πNS′ . We can then
use S ′′ as successor instead. In order to prove this formally, we first need the following, technical
observations.
Lemma 13. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support and S ′ be a (e, i)-neighboring, a-degenerate
support. Then,
(i) w⊤S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i = −1,
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(ii) ker(LS′) ∩ P = span(L
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i). In particular, ∆π
N
S′ = αL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i for some α 6= 0, and
w⊤S,e,i∆π
N
S 6= 0.
(iii) If w⊤S,e,i∆πS 6= 0 and S
′ is feasible, then the equation LS′π = λ∆y + bS′ has a solution if
and only if λ = λ∗S′ for some fixed λ
∗
S′ ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) LS′π = λ
∗
S′∆y + bS′ and π ∈ P if and only if π = L
+
S′
(
λ∗S′∆y + bS′
)
+ ξ∆πNS′ for some
generalized inverse L+S′ with L
+
S′
(
λ∗∆y + bS′
)
∈ P.
Proof. Using a corollary from the Sherman-Morrison formula for generalized inverses [27, Cor. 18.5.2],
we obtain
rank(LS′) = rank(LS) + rank(1 +w
⊤
S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S,e,i)− 1.
By assumption, rank(LS′)− rank(LS) = −1 and, hence, we obtain (i). Further, we get
LS′L
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i = LSL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,iL
+
Sw
′
S′,e,i
= w′S′,e,i −w
′
S′,e,i = 0.
Thus, span(L+Sw
′
S′,e,i) ⊂ ker(LS′) ∩ P. Since dim(ker(LS′) ∩ P) = 1, the claim (ii) follows.
Assume that w⊤S,e,i∆πS 6= 0 and S
′ is feasible. Then, by feasibility, there is a λ∗S′ such that
LS′π = λ∆y+ bS′ has a solution. However, the equation LS′∆π = ∆y has no solution ∆π since
LS′∆π = ∆y
⇒
(
LS +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i
)
∆π = ∆y
⇒ w⊤S,e,iL
+
S
(
LS +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i
)
∆π = w⊤S,e,iL
+
S∆y
(i)
⇒ 0 = σSw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS 6= 0.
Hence, LS′π = λ∆y + bS′ has a solution for at most one value of λ and (iii) follows. Statement
(iv) follows directly from (ii).
Note, that the statements of Lemma 13 hold for any (fixed) choice of the generalized inverses
of LS and LS′ . In the non-a-degenerate case, we use the fact that there is a unique generalized
inverse L∗S that maps into P. For a-degenerate regions, there in no longer a unique such choice of
the generalized inverse. For the remainder of this section we assume we have chosen some fixed
generalized inverse L+S′ that maps into P.
Assume that the continuative (e, i)-neighbor S ′ of some non-a-degenerate support S is a-
degenerate. Then, we know that S ′ is feasible (since S and S ′ share a boundary potential), thus
we can use Lemma 13(iii) and (iv) to describe the polytope PS′ of S
′ as
PS′ =
{
π ∈ P
∣∣ LS′π − bS′ = λ∗S′∆y, TS′WS′(G⊤π − b) ≤ 0}
=
{
L+S′(λ
∗
S′∆y+ bS′) + ξ∆π
N
S′
∣∣ TS′WS′(G⊤(L+S′(λ∗S′∆y+ bS′) + ξ∆πNS′)− b) ≤ 0, ξ ∈ R}.
We see that the polytope PS′ of an a-degenerate region is parametrized by ξ ∈ R along the nullspace
direction ∆πNS′ , in contrast to a non-a-degenerate region S, where PS is parametrized by λ and the
potential direction ∆πS .
Analogously to the non-degenerate case, we divide the edge-player-pairs into groups E+S′ , E
−
S′ ,
and E0S′ by replacing (the non-existing) ∆πS′ by ∆π
N
S′ . Then we can define values
ξ¯S′,e,i :=
τS
′
e,iu
⊤
e,iWS′b−w
⊤
S′,e,iL
+
S′(λ
∗
S′∆y+ bS′)
w⊤S′,e,i∆π
N
S′
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for all (e, i) /∈ E0S′ and define ξ
min
S′ := max(e,i)∈E−
S
ξ¯S′,e,i and ξ
max
S′ := min(e,i)∈E+
S
ξ¯S′,e,i. Then, similar
to Lemma 5, we obtain
PS′ =
{
L+S′(λ
∗
S′∆y + bS′) + ξ∆π
N
S′ | ξ
min
S′ ≤ ξ ≤ ξ
max
S′
}
.
Note that PS′ could be unbounded if E
+
S or E
−
S is empty. In fact, this is not the case: Since
moving along the nullspace direction ∆πNS′ does not change the excess, the flow change ∆x with
∆xie := w
⊤
S′,e,i∆π
N
S′ if i ∈ Se and x
i
e = 0 if i /∈ Se, must be a non-zero flow circulation. Since
this flow ∆x satisfies by definition ∆πN,iw −∆π
N,i
v = aie∆x¯e, there must be at least one edge with
negative total flow ∆x¯e and, hence, at least one one player with negative flow ∆x
i
e. In particular,
there is one player such that the flow change ∆xie := w
⊤
S′,e,i∆π
N
S′ does not hove the same sign for all
edges. Thus, at least for this player i, one edge-player-pair (e, i) is in E+S′ and one edge-player-pair
(e′, i) is in E−S′ .
We therefore know that a non-a-degenerate support S ′ has well-defined boundary potentials
π
min
S′ ,π
max
S′ . As for non-a-degenerate supports we can find continuative neighbors by looking at the
(e, i)-neighbors that are shortest-path-supports for all pairs (e, i) that induce ξminS′ and ξ
max
S′ .
With the same arguments as in Lemma 8, we get that there is always at least one continuative
neighbor in every boundary potential and, analogously to the non-a-degenerate case, we say a region
is a-b-degenerate if there is more than one continuative neighbor. We assume that every support
is non-a-b-degenerate and discuss this case later in Section A.2. Then, for every non-degenerate S
and any a-degenerate neighbor support S ′, we can define the well defined map N˜(S,S ′) that maps
to the unique neighbor of S ′ that is not S. The next lemma proves that this support then is again
non-a-degenerate and thus can be used as the successor or predecessor of S.
Lemma 14. Let S be a non-a-degenerate support. Further, let S ′ be a continuative (e, i)-neighbor
of S that is a-degenerate. Then, there is a uniquely defined support N˜(S,S ′) 6= S that is a neighbor
of S ′ and non-a-degenerate.
Proof. We already argued that such support exists and is unique as long as S ′ is not a-b-degenerate.
Now let S ′′ = N˜(S,S ′) and assume that S ′ and S ′′ are (e′, i′)-neighbors. It remains to be shown,
that S ′′ is also non-a-degenerate. By definition, (e′, i′) is the minimizer of ξmaxS or the maximizer
of ξminS , thus (e, i) /∈ E
0
S , and we have that w
⊤
S′,e′,i′∆π
N
S 6= 0 yielding w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′∆π
N
S 6= 0.
Since rank(w′S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′) = 1 we know that ker(w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′) = {v ∈ R
nk |v /∈ span(∆πNS )}.
Finally, let v ∈ ker(LS′′). Then we have two cases.
a) v ∈ span(∆πNS ). Then 0 = LS′′v = LS′v +w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′v = w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′′,e′,i′v 6= 0, which is
a contradiction.
b) v /∈ span(∆πNS ). Then 0 = LS′′v = LS′v + w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′v = LS′v which is equivalent to
v ∈ N (v ∈ span(∆πNS ) is excluded by assumption).
Hence, we have ker(LS′′) = N , i.e., S
′′ is non-degenerate.
The preceding lemma enables us to redefine the neighbor functions Nmin and Nmax as follows.
We define new neighbor functions N˜min, N˜max : S→ S ∪ {∅} by
N˜min(S) :=
{
Nmin(S) if Nmin(S) ∈ S,
N˜(S, Nmin(S)) if Nmin(S) /∈ S,
N˜max(S) :=
{
Nmax(S) if Nmax(S) ∈ S,
N˜(S, Nmax(S)) if Nmax(S) /∈ S,
where N˜(S, Nmax(S)) is the well defined support from Lemma 14. It remains to be shown that the
predecessor and successor functions pred and succ defined on the basis of the new neighbor function
N˜S are compliant in the sense of Lemma 9.
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Lemma 15. The predecessor and successor functions with respect to the neighbor function N˜S are
well-defined and computable in polynomial time. Further, we have
(i) pred(S) 6= ∅ ⇒ succ(pred(S)) = S
(ii) succ(S) 6= ∅ ⇒ pred(succ(S)) = S.
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows by definition. Further, (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 9
whenever NS(π) ∈ S for the respective boundary potential π. To prove this in the case of skipping
a weakly-a-degenerate support with the function N˜(S,S ′) we need to prove an analogue property to
Theorem 2(iii). This is difficult since the orientation of any a-degenerate is zero. We overcome this
difficulty by adding a small perturbation to the block Laplacian matrices restoring the regularity
of LˆS′ for the weakly degenerate support S
′ enabling us to apply Theorem 2 also in the degenerate
setting.
Formally, for some δ > 0, we define the matrix Di as follows: Take the (n−1)× (n−1)-identity
matrix multiplied by δ and insert a row and column at the position of the index of the vertex si
such that the resulting matrix has zero row- and column-sum. Thus,
Di =


δ 0 · · · 0 −δ 0 · · · 0
0 δ · · · 0 −δ 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · δ −δ 0 · · · 0
−δ −δ · · · −δ (n− 1)δ −δ · · · −δ
0 0 · · · 0 −δ δ · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 −δ 0 · · · δ


.
Then let D be the block diagonal matrix containing the matrices Di, i = 1, . . . , k as block diagonal
elements. Further, let Dˆ be the matrix obtained fromD by deleting the rows and columns belonging
to the source vertices of the respective players. Then, in partiuclar, Dˆ is a k(n − 1) × k(n − 1)-
diagonal matrix with δ on the diagonal. Hence, for every matrix A ∈ Rk(n−1)×k(n−1) the matrix
A+ Dˆ is non-singular for almost all δ > 0.
For any block Laplacian matrix L define Lδ := L +D, Lˆ
δ
:= Lˆ
δ
+ Dˆ, and Lδ,∗ as the matrix
obtained from
(
Lˆ
δ)−1
by adding zero rows and columns for the deleted rows and columns in Lˆ
δ
.
(The latter is well-defined for almost all δ > 0.) Then it can be shown that Lδ,∗ is a generalized
inverse of Lδ. Further, we define ∆πδ := sgn(det(Lˆ
δ
))Lδ,∗∆y. By definition, Lδ
δ→0
−−−→ L and
Lˆ
δ δ→0
−−−→ Lˆ element-wise. By the continuity of the inverse this also implies that Lδ,∗
δ→0
−−−→ L∗
whenever Lˆ is non-singlar. Thus, in these cases, ∆πδ
δ→0
−−−→ ∆π.
Let π ∈ ∂S be a boundary potential of some non-a-degenerate support such that S ′ := N(S) is
a-degenerate. Further, let S ′′ := N˜(S,S ′) be the neighboring, non-a-degenerate support of S ′ from
Lemma 14. We assume that S and S ′ are (e, i)-neighboring and S ′ and S ′′ are (e′, i′)-neighboring.
Then,
LδS′ = LS′ +D = LS +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i +D = L
δ
S +w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i
and, analogously, LδS′′ = L
δ
S′ +w
′
S′′,e′,i′w
⊤
S′,e′,i′ .
We claim that there is a δ∗ > 0 then such for all 0 < δ < δ∗ the following holds:
a) The matrix Lˆ
δ
S′ is non-singular and the sign of the determinant sgn(Lˆ
δ
S′) =: σ˜S′ is constant.
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b) The signs sgn(det(Lˆ
δ
S)) = σS and sgn(det(Lˆ
δ
S′′)) = σS′′ are constant.
Both claims follow by the fact that the determinant of the perturbed block Laplacians Lˆ
δ
are
continuous polynomials in δ.
With the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
det(Lˆ
δ
S′) = det(Lˆ
δ
S)(1 +w
⊤
S,e,iL
δ,∗
S w
′
S′,e,i). (17)
We define a new direction ∆πδS′ := det(Lˆ
δ
S′)L
δ,∗
S′ ∆y for the support S
′. Then, using the Sherman-
Morrison formula as in Theorem 2,
∆πδS′ = det(Lˆ
δ
S′)L
δ,∗
S′ ∆y
= det(Lˆ
δ
S′)
(
L
∗,δ
S −
1
1 +w⊤S,e,iL
δ,∗
S w
′
S′,e,i
L
∗,δ
S w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,iL
δ,∗
S
)
∆y
(17)
= det(Lˆ
δ
S) (1 +w
⊤
S,e,iL
δ,∗
S w
′
S′,e,i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ→0−−−→0 by Lemma 13
L
∗,δ
S ∆y − L
∗,δ
S w
′
S′,e,iw
⊤
S,e,i det(Lˆ
δ
S)L
δ,∗
S ∆y︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ→0
−−−→|det(LˆδS)|∆piS
δ→0
−−−→ (−|det(LˆS)|w
⊤
S,e,i∆πS)L
∗
Sw
′
S′,e,i.
Thus, by Lemma 13, the direction ∆πδS′ converges to (a multiple of) the nullspace direction ∆π
N
S′ ,
i.e., there is α ∈ R such that ∆πδS′
δ→0
−−−→ α∆πNS′ . Thus, in particular, w
⊤
S,e,i∆π
δ
S′
δ→0
−−−→ αw⊤S,e,i∆π
N
S′
and, hence,
αw⊤S,e,i∆π
N
S′ = (−|det(LˆS)|w
⊤
S,e,i∆πS)w
⊤
S,e,iL
∗
Sw
′
S′,e,i = |det(LˆS)|w
⊤
S,e,i∆πS . (18)
Similarly, we can show that ∆πδS′
δ→0
−−−→ (−|det(LˆS′′)|w
⊤
S′,e′,i′∆πS′′)L
∗
S′′w
′
S′′,e′,i′ and thus get anal-
ogously that
αw⊤S′,e′,i′∆π
N
S′ = |det(LˆS′′)|w
⊤
S′,e′,i′∆πS′′ . (19)
By the definition of S ′′, we know that the direction ∆πNS′ is directed away from the the hyper-
plane that separates S and S ′ and is directed towards the hyperplane that separates S ′ and S ′′.
This means that sgn(w⊤S′,e,i∆π
N
S′) = − sgn(w
⊤
S′,e′,i′∆π
N
S′). Finally, we obtain
sgn(w⊤S,e,i∆πS)
(18)
= sgn(αw⊤S,e,i∆π
N
S′)
= − sgn(αw⊤S′,e,i∆π
N
S′)
= sgn(αw⊤S′,e′,i′∆π
N
S′)
(19)
= sgn(w⊤S′,e′,i′∆πS′′) = − sgn(w
⊤
S′′,e′,i′∆πS′′).
This sign condition implies that, the boundary potential π ∈ ∂S ∩ ∂S ′ that lies on the boundary
between S and S ′ is πminS if and only if the potential π
′ ∈ ∂S ′∩∂S ′′ that lies on the boundary between
S ′ and S ′′ is πmaxS′′ and vice versa. Thus, we get that pred(succ(S)) = S and succ(pred(S)) = S,
respectively, also in the case when N˜S = S
′′(π).
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Figure 4: The 8 player game from Example 1. (a) The graph with sources and sinks of the players and the cost
functions of player 1 in green. (b) The strategies of the players given by the fraction α of the demand that is routed
on the direct edge between source and sink, parametrized by the demand multiplier λ. (c) The support polytopes
PS of the three supports with the boundary potentials in a projection of the potential space P .
Example 1. We consider a game with 8 players on the graph given in Figure 4. Every player has two
adjacent vertices as source and sink vertex and a demand of ri = 2. The game is player-symmetric
4,
i.e., for every player the edge connecting the source and the sink vertex (e.g. e8 for player 1) is
equipped with the cost function c1(x) = 9x+ 3 and the edges on the longer path from the source
to the sink (e.g. e1, e3, e5 for player 1) are equipped with the cost function c2(x) = x+6. All other
edges are assumed to have cost functions with high offsets and slopes such that they are never in
the support of the respective players. As the whole game is symmetric for the players, there are
three possible strategy profiles:
a) All players use the direct path between source and sink.
b) All players use both path between source and sink.
c) All players use the long path between source and sink.
Since all strategies and all cost functions are symmetric4 we give all potentials, flows and directions
for the first player routing demand from v1 to v4. All other potential and flow values are given
implicitly.
For small demands λr, λ ≤ 12 , because of the relatively high offset of the long path, all players
will route their demand on the direct path to their source. The potential for the zero flow x0 = 0
is the shortest path potential π0 = (0, 6, 12, 3)⊤ . This yields the initial support S0 where the edges
e1, e3 and e8 are active for the player 1. (Note that we consider the edges e1, e3 active although
they are not used by the player. They are only part of the shortest path network.) We obtain the
potential direction ∆π0 = (0, 2, 4, 36)⊤ that induces the flow direction ∆x0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)⊤ .
For λ = 12 , we obtain the potential π
1 = (0, 7, 14, 21) = π0 + 12∆π
0 inducing the flow x1 =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)⊤ , i.e., every player routes exactly one flow unit on the direct path from source
to sink.
4Symmetric means here: The game looks the same for every player up to the numbering of the players and edges,
but not every player has the same cost function on every edge.
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Denote by eli the last edge of the long path for player i (e.g. el1 = e5). In the potential π
1,
all edges eli become active at once
5. This defines a new support S1 which is then is a-degenerate,
the Laplacian matrix has rank 23 and ker(LS1) ∩ P = span
(
(0, 1, 2, 3)⊤
)
. Hence, the nullspace
direction is ∆πNS1 = (0, 1, 2, 3)
⊤ inducing the circulation ∆x1 =
(
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0,
1
3 , 0, 0,−
1
3
)⊤
. The
potential π2 := π1 + 3∆πNS1 = (0, 10, 20, 30)
⊤ induces the flow x2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)⊤ . Note
that this flow is still an equilibrium for the demand 12r. In fact, all flows
x(α) =
(
(1− α), 0, (1 − α), 0, (1 − α), 0, 0, α
)⊤
, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
are equilibria for the demand 12r, i.e., there are infinitely many equilibria when every player wants
to route a demand of 1.
Finally, denote by edi the direct edge connecting the source and sink of player i (e.g. ed1 = e8).
All these edges become inactive in the potential π2 which defines the next support S2
6 which is
non-a-degenerate. With this support, we obtain the direction ∆π2 = (0, 8, 16, 24)⊤ inducing the
flow direction ∆x = (2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0)⊤ . For λ = 1 we then get the potential π3 := π2 + 12∆π
3 =
(0, 14, 28, 42)⊤ inducing the (solution) flow x3 = (2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0)⊤ .
A.2 b-Degeneracy
In this section, we develop a rule for handling b-degenerate games. A game is b-degenerate, if there
is a b-degenerate support. That is by definition a support with |NminS | > 1 or |N
max
S | > 1, i.e., a
support with a boundary potential that is feasible in more than one (e, i)-neighboring supports.
This is the case if and only if max(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯S,e,i or max(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯S,e,i has not a unique solution (e, i).
Concretely, this means that when increasing or decreasing the demand, multiple edge-player-pairs
have their activity status at once, e.g., if two edges become active for one player or one edge becomes
inactive for two players and so on.
Intuitively, b-degeneracy occurs if the offsets of the cost functions b are chosen in a bad way
such that the hyperplanes induced by the inequalities in the polytopes PS intersect exactly in
some boundary potential of some support. It is also somewhat intuitive that a very small, random
perturbation of the offsets b would translate the hyperplanes in a way that, almost surely, they do
not intersect in boundary potentials anymore. Further, a small perturbation should not change the
equilibrium to much.
In fact, we will show that there is an explicit, small perturbation ǫ that can be added to the
vector b such that the game with these perturbed offsets is non-b-degenerate. Further, we will
show that all feasible supports in this game are also feasible for the original, unperturbed game
and, hence, it will be enough to compute the states S of the perturbed game. Additionally, we
will see that it is not necessary to carry out the perturbation explicitly. Rather, we can follow
a lexicographic criterion. We initially assume that every game is non-a-degenerate and discuss
a-b-degeneracy below.
Let ε > 0. Then we define the perturbation vector
ε :=
(
ε, ε2, . . . , εkm−1, εkm
)⊤
∈ Rmk
and the vector of perturbed offsets bε := b + ε. We call the game with this offset vector the
perturbed game. By definition, for every support S, the perturbed polytope
PεS :=
{
π ∈ P | 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, λ∆y = LSπ −GCSb
ε, TSWS
(
G⊤π − bε
)
≤ 0
}
.
5Note that this means that the game is b-degenerate—we ignore this for now for the benefit of an easier example.
6Again, this is a degenerate boundary crossing.
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contains all potentials with support S in the perturbed game. Analogously to the non-degenerate
case, we define values
λ¯εS,e,i :=
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iWSb−w
⊤
S,e,iL
∗
SbS
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
−
τSe,iu
⊤
e,i(WSG
⊤L∗SGΩS − Imk)WSε
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
= λ¯S,e,i −
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWSε
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
,
where XS := (WSG
⊤L∗SGΩS − Imk). Let λ
min,ε
S := max
{
0,max(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯εS,e,i
}
, and λmax,εS :=
min
{
1,min(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯εS,e,i
}
. Then we get with the proof of Lemma 5 (by replacing b by bε = b+ ε)
that
PεS =
{
λσS∆πS + L
∗
SbS | λ
min,ε
S ≤ λ ≤ λ
max,ε
S
}
for every non-a-degenerate support S.
With the next theorem, we will prove two things: First, we show that every support that is
feasible in the perturbed game is also feasible in the original justifying that it is sufficient to consider
just these supports. Second, we show that the perturbed game is non-b-degenerate.
For any support S, we say two edges e, e′ are serial-dependent for player i in support S if e, e′
are serial-dependent in the subgraph of G containing only the active edges of player i.
Theorem 10. Let S be a non-a-degenerate, total support. Then there is ε∗S > 0 such that for all
0 < ε < ε∗S the following holds.
(i) If S is infeasible, then PεS = ∅ as well.
(ii) If S is feasible and non-b-degenerate, then
argmin
(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯S,e,i = argmin
(e,i)∈E+
S
λ¯εS,e,i and argmax
(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯S,e,i = argmax
(e,i)∈E−
S
λ¯εS,e,i.
(iii) If S is feasible and b-degenerate, then PεS = ∅ or, for any two edge-player-pairs (e, i), (e
′, i′) /∈
E0S , we have that λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ implies that λ¯
ε
S,e,i = 0 or i = i
′ and e, e′ are serial-dependent
for player i.
Proof. Let S be an infeasible support. Denote by αe,i(λ) := u
⊤
e,iTSWS(G
⊤
π − b) the value of
the left hand side of the inequality corresponding to the pair (e, i). Note that αe,i(λ) depends
continuously on λ via the vector π which is a continuous function of λ. Since S is infeasible,
there is, for every λ ∈ [0, 1], at least one inequality that has strictly positive left-hand-side and is
thus violated. This means α(λ) := max(e,i) αe,i(λ) > 0. As α(λ) is continuous function, we get
α := minλ∈[0,1] α(λ) > 0.
Every inequality in PεS is perturbed by some value βe,i(ε) with βe,i(ε)
ǫ→0
−−→ 0. Thus, if we choose
ε∗S small enough, then βe,i(ε) < α for all pairs (e, i) and all 0 < ε < ε
∗
S . This implies that there is
a violated inequality in PεS for every λ as well. Hence, P
ε
S = ∅ and (i) follows.
If S is feasible and non-b-degenerate, then there is unique minimizer (e, i) = argmin(e′,i′)∈E+
S
λ¯S,e′,i′ .
This implies α := λ¯S,e′,i′ − λ¯S,e,i > 0 for all (e, i) 6= (e
′, i′) ∈ E+S . If we denote by βe,i(ε) :=
−
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWSε
σSw
⊤
S,e,i
∆piS
the perturbation of the value λ¯S,e,i, then we choose ε
∗
S small enough such that
|βe′,i′(ε)| <
α
2 for all pairs (e
′, i′). But then, λ¯εS′,e′,i′− λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯S,e′,i′−βe′,i′(ε)− λ¯S,e,i+βe′,i′(ε) > 0.
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Hence, (e, i) is the unique minimizer of argmin(e′,i′)∈E+
S
λ¯εS,e′,i′ . Since the same proof holds also for
the maximizer, (ii) follows.
For the last statement, we have to prove that if S is feasible and PεS 6= ∅, then λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′
only occurs for serial-dependent edges of one player i. For the rest of the proof, we assume that
0 < ε < ε∗S and that ε
∗
S is chosen small enough to ensure that λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ implies that
λ¯S,e,i = λ¯S,e′,i′ . (This is true since we can choose ε
∗
S so small such that λ¯S,e,i 6= λ¯S,e′,i′ implies
λ¯εS,e,i 6= λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ by choosing ε
∗
S similar to the proof of (ii).) Further, we assume that ε
∗
S is chosen
small enough such that XSWSε 6= 0 for all 0 < ε < ε
∗
S . Using these assumptions leads to the
following claim.
Claim 7. If, for two pairs (e, i), (e′, i′) ∈ E0S , we have λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ , then(
τSe,i
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
u⊤e,i −
τSe′,i′
σSw⊤S,e′,i′∆πS
u⊤e′,i′
)
XS = 0.
Proof of Claim 7. Assume that λ¯εS,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ . Then, as stated above we can assume that λ¯S,e,i =
λ¯S,e′,i′ holds as well since ε is chosen small enough. Thus,
0 = λ¯εS,e,i − λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′
=
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWSε
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
−
τSe′,i′u
⊤
e′,i′XSWSε
σSw⊤S,e′,i′∆πS
=
(
τSe,i
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
u⊤e,i −
τSe′,i′
σSw⊤S,e′,i′∆πS
u⊤e′,i′
)
XSWSε.
By our assumption on ε and the fact that WS has full rank by Lemma 3, the claim follows.
Claim 7 shows that two λ¯εS,e,i values can be the same only if a certain vector is in the left
nullspace of the matrix XS . Therefore, we study the left nullspace of XS in the next claim.
Claim 8. v⊤XS = 0 if and only if there is a vector z ∈ R
nk such that v = (GΩS)
⊤z.
Proof of Claim 8. Let YS := WSG
⊤L∗SGΩS = WSG
⊤(GΩSWSG
⊤)∗GΩS . Then we can write
XS = YS − Imk.
We note that the space spanned by the colums of GΩS is a subspace of the space spanned by
the columns of LS = GΩWG
⊤. Thus, we can use [27, Lemma 9.3.5], which yields
GΩSYS = GΩSWSG
⊤(GΩSWSG
⊤)∗GΩS = GΩS .
Hence, GΩSXS = 0 and the if-direction follows.
For the only-if direction, observe that rank(YS) ≤ rank(GΩS) by definition. On the other hand,
we have that rank(GΩS) = rank(GΩSYS) ≤ rank(YS). Thus, rank(YS) = rank(GΩS). We
conclude that for every v that is not a combination of the rows of GΩS , v
⊤YS = 0 (otherwise the
rank of YS would be strictly greater than rank(GΩS)). Thus, if there is no z with v = (GΩS)
⊤z,
then v⊤YS = 0 and, hence, v
⊤XS = −v
⊤ 6= 0 and the only-if-direction follows.
Claim 8 states that a vector v is in the left nullspace of the matrix XS if and only if there is a
potential vector z that assigns a potential value ziv for every player to every vertex such that
ve,i =
{
0 if i /∈ Se,
ziw − z
i
v if i ∈ Se
(20)
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for every edge e = (v,w) and every player i ∈ [k]. Thus, in particular, the components of every
vector of the left nullspace of XS that corresponds to a player-edge-pair with an inactive edge are
zero.
We denote by ∆x˜ := WSG
⊤L∗S∆y the (pseudo-)flow change on the edges in support S. In
particular, the vector ∆xS := ΩS∆x˜S contains the (real) flow change on all active edges. (In fact,
it is easy to show that G∆xS = ∆y, hence ∆xS is a (not necessarily positive) flow for demand r.)
Claim 9. Let (e, i) be some edge-player-pair with i ∈ Se. If u
⊤
e,i∆x˜S 6= 0, then λ¯
ε
S,e,i = 0 or the
edge e is contained in a cycle in the subgraph of G induced by the active edges of player i.
Proof of Claim 9. Since we assume that e is active for player i, we have that u⊤e,i∆xS = u
⊤
e,i∆x˜S 6=
0, i.e., the flow change on edge e for player i is not zero. This implies, since ∆xS is a flow, e must
lie on some path of active edge between si and ti. If there e is not contained in some (active)
cycle for player i, all si-ti-paths in the active network use e and, thus, e must carry all flow, i.e.,
xie = λri for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Thus, the inequality corresponding to the edge player pair (e, i) is
xie = λri ≥ 0. Since λ¯
ε
S,e,i computes, by definition, the value λ for which this inequality is tight, we
get that λ¯εS,e,i = 0.
Claim 10. Let (e, i), (e′, i′) /∈ E0S be two player-edge-pairs with λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ 6= 0. Then i = i
′.
Proof of Claim 10. First, we note that, since (e, i) /∈ E0S implies
0 6= σSw
⊤
S,e,i∆πS = τ
S
e,iu
⊤
e,iWSG
⊤L∗S∆y = τ
S
e,i∆x˜S .
Second, by Claim 7, we get that there is a vector v in the left nullspace of XS with ve,i 6= 0,
ve′,i′ 6= 0 and all other components equal to zero. Thus, we infer from (20) that i ∈ Se and i
′ ∈ Se′ .
Together this means that the Claim 10 applies, hence we can assume that both edges lie in cycles
of active edges. If i 6= i′, then the edge e is the only edge in the network of active edges of player
i with non-zero value ve,i. Since all values ve˜,i = 0 for all other edges e˜ in this cycle, we have that
ziw = z
i
v for every edge e˜ = (v,w) along the cycle. But this implies that, in particular, ve,i = 0, and
thus we have a contradiction and conclude that i = i′.
By Claim 10, we have that if PεS 6= ∅ and λ¯
ε
S,e,i 6= 0 and λ¯
ε
S,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ , we have i = i
′. We
conclude the proof by showing that in this case e and e′ are also serial-dependent for player i.
By Claim 7, we know that there is a vector v in the left nullspace that has only two non-zero
ve,i and ve′,i. By Claim 8 we know that this vector satisfies also (20). Thus, we know there is a
potential vector z that is constant for all players other than i and that satsifies ziw = z
i
v for all
edges (v,w) /∈ {e, e′}. Since, furthermore, both edges must be contained in a cycle of active edges
by Claim 9, ve,i and ve′,i can only be non-zero if e and e
′ are serial-dependent in the active network
of player i.
Theorem 10 shows that any infeasible support stays infeasible, when perturbing the offsets
b, any non-b-degenerate support stays feasible and every b-degenerate support is either removed
(infeasible), has “essentially unique” maximizer and minimizer of the values λ¯εS,e,i, or has λ
min,ε
S = 0.
The latter yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let ε∗ := minS∈S ε
∗
S , where ε
∗
S > 0 are the values from Theorem 10. Then ε
∗ > 0
and for all 0 < ε < ε∗, the perturbed game with offsets b+ ε is non-b-degenerate.
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Proof. Assume that we have more than one continuative neighbor for one boundary potential of
some feasible support S of the perturbed game. Then, λ¯εS,e,i = λ¯
ε
S,e′,i′ and λ¯
ε
S,e,i 6= 0, since we do
not need any (unique) neighbor for a 0-potential. Thus we know from Theorem 10 that i = i′ and
e and e′ are serial-dependent in the active network for player i. Then, as we already argued in the
proof of Lemma 8, only inactivating the edge e that is the farthest away from si yields a shortest-
path-support. Thus, there is just one well-defined continuative neighbor—the (e, i) neighbor with
e being the farthest from si.
Denote by
S
ε := {S : S is a feasible, non-a-degenerate, shortest-path-support for offsets b+ ε}
the support states of the game with perturbed offsets b+ε. Then, by Theorem 10(i), we have that
S
ε ⊆ S. Since the perturbed game is non-b-degenerate, it has as shown before a unqiue initial
support for the zero flow as well as well-defined predecessor and successor functions. Since Sε ⊆ S
we can also use these functions for the unperturbed, degenerate game.
Note that Theorem 10 also implies that, for every game with offset vector b that is in general
position, the game is non-b-degenerate.
Implicit perturbation. As mentioned above, it is not necessary to carry out the perturbation
explicitly. The initial support can be found by computing the unique shortest path for the edge
length b + ε for every player. To do this without explicit computation, we can just compute the
shortest paths for edge lengths b and then compute on the resulting shortest path network again
shortest paths, but this time with respect to the edge length ue,i. For the second shortest path
computation we assign vectors as path length and then compute the lexicographically shortest path.
By doing so, we consider edges being shorter if the monomial εl assigned to this edge has higher a
higher degree. For small ε this is equivalent to computing the shortest paths with explicit ε values.
The same idea can be used to compute the successors and predecessors. If two edge-player-pairs
have the same λ¯S,e,i value, then we have to compare the value added by the perturbation. This is
as shown above the polynomial
pS,e,i(ε) := λ¯
ε
S,e,i − λ¯S,e,i = −
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWS
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
ε.
Again, for small ε, it is equivalent to finding the polynomial pS,e,i(ε) with minimal value to just
find the lexicographically smallest coefficient vector of these polynomials, i.e., the lexicographically
smallest vector
mS,e,i := −
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWS
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
.
Hence, we do not need the explicit perturbation for the successor and predecessor functions, neither.
a-b-degenerate games. Finally, we discuss the case of a-b-degeneracy. An a-degenerate region
is also b-degenerate, if the maximum or minimum in ξminS or ξ
max
S do not have a unique maximizer
or minimizer. We will now argue, that in the perturbed version of the game, this does not happen.
If we consider the game with perturbed offsets b+ ε, we get perturbed versions of the values ξ¯S,e,i,
analogously to the values λ¯εS,e,i above. If S is an a-degenerate support, then we obtain the following
ξ¯S,e,i values for the perturbed game:
ξ¯εS,e,i := ξ¯S,e,i −
τSe,iu
⊤
e,iXSWSε
σSw⊤S,e,i∆πS
,
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where XS := (WSG
⊤L+SGΩS − Imk) for some fixed choice of the generalized inverse L
+
S .
Thus, the perturbation has the same effect on the values ξ¯S,e,i as on the values λ¯S,e,i, and we
can prove an analogue version of Theorem 10 for the values ξ¯S,e,i. The only difference now is that
the matrix XS depends on the generalized inverse L
+
S which has in general lower rank than the
inverse L∗S in non-a-degenerate region. However, since the rowspace of YS := WSG
⊤L+SGΩS is
by definition still a subset of the rowspace of GΩS , we still have that v
⊤XS = 0 only if there exists
a potential z with v = (GΩS)
⊤z. This is a weaker form of Claim 8 in the proof of Theorem 10
(where we have an if and only if statement), but still enough for the rest of the proof to hold.
Thus, we have that in the perturbed game, we always find a unique neighbor, also in the a-b-
degenerate case. By comparing the vectors mS,e,i lexicographically, we still can find these unique
neighbors implicitly.
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